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ABSTRACT
Drawing on research from the fields sociology and demography, this dissertation
endeavors to deconstruct the declines in Child, Early and Forced Marriage (CEFM)
around the world by assessing the power of international institutions to create and enforce
global norms across a wide range of nation-states. I conducted three different studies on
CEFM at different levels to better understand how international policy, the cultural
composition of countries, macro level demographic trends, and the relationships between
national leadership and international governance have effected changes over the last few
decades beginning in 1980. I used comparative historical methods in conjunction with
demographic techniques for analyzing population data to derive new conclusions that
illuminate policy and practice globally. In the first chapter, I analyzed the variation in
global norm adoption by determining if the cultural composition of countries can be used
to explain the adoption of national minimum age-of-marriage laws to prohibit CEFM. I
find that religious homogeneity is significantly correlated
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with higher minimum ages, but also with legal exceptions, at the country level. This
represents compliance with the global norm but results in a lower ‘true’ minimum age-ofmarriage after considering exceptions. In the second chapter, I analyzed the effect of the
Second Demographic Transition on reducing CEFM in the region of Latin America. I
find that the prevalence of CEFM declined dramatically in the region during this period,
although the absolute numbers of child brides increased. The third chapter utilized the
unique case of Iran to describe how a fractured relationship between the state and the
international community can reduce the effectiveness of global norm diffusion. I find that
Iranian policy doesn’t adhere to global norms, that about 99% of Iranian child brides
were younger than their husband, and the youngest brides (12 years old) had the largest
average age difference (16 years).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Child, Early, and Forced Marriage (CEFM) is occurring in countries all over the
world, at all levels of development. South Asia is by far the leading region in absolute
numbers, but it is nearly as common (considering proportions) in sub-Saharan Africa
(United Nations Population Fund 2012). Four South Asian countries, Bangladesh (66%
of women are married under 18), India (47%), Nepal (41%), and Pakistan, have among
the highest absolute numbers of girls marrying early, but in sub-Saharan Africa, Niger
and Chad have even higher percentages (75% and 72 %) (Marphatia, Ambale, and Reid
2017; United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Substantial variations are found within regions (11 to 46%) between (from 0 to
<70%) and within countries (e.g. the range in India was 11 to 60%), but most child brides
live in rural areas (about three times as many compared to urban areas) (United Nations
Population Fund 2012). Typically rural areas are more inaccessible, provide lower levels
of education, and show less awareness of international norms which corresponds to less
behavioral change (Cloward 2014). Early marriage in rural areas generally relates to the
social values observed there, typically more religious and patriarchal traditions are found
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in remote rural regions of a country compared to urban areas (Arthur et al. 2014; United
Nations Population Fund 2012).At the global level changes in national laws have
increased the minimum age of marriage in dozens of countries, but legal exceptions
undermine their effectiveness (Arthur et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2013; Maswikwa et al.
2015). Changes at the global level in the rates of child marriage in either rural and urban
areas over the last decade have been limited, but some countries have seen double digit
percentage reductions (United Nations Population Fund 2012).
The differences between international and national laws suggest that the earliest
acceptable age for women to marry is dependent upon the culture she lives in (Arthur et
al. 2014; Cloward 2014). Early marriage occurs most often in societies where social
norms enable or tolerate gender inequity, where marriage remains the most common
context for sexual intercourse and strong social sanctions for sex and childbearing outside
of marriage exist, because it is often seen as way to prevent premarital sex and to transfer
the responsibilities of protecting or providing for the girl from father to husband (United
Nations Population Fund 2012). It is much less likely to occur when girls are afforded the
opportunity to pursue increased education and careers that empower them economically,
as well as socially (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012;
Wodon et al. 2017).
As a social institution, marriage is nearly universal, but there has been substantial
variation in the age of first marriage across time and place, women usually marry at
younger ages than men, and are more often married to older spouses (Hanmer and
Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017). Gender
equality is in important because social norms and customary practices can influence the
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law’s treatment of the age of consent, in most cases making it acceptable for girls to
marry earlier than boys and considering girls at very young ages to be adults (Arthur et
al. 2014; Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Laws that set a minimum age of marriage vary widely, families and girls are
sometime unaware that laws against child marriage exist, enforcement of these laws is
often lax, and legal exceptions are often available (Hanmer and Elefante 2016;
Melchiorre and Atkins 2011; United Nations Population Fund 2012). Because early
marriage is a much more prevalent practice for girls than for boys, and national laws and
legal exceptions often allow for girls to be married at younger ages than boys, it
perpetuates gender inequality by denying girls their human rights (Arthur et al. 2014;
Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Melchiorre and Atkins 2011; United Nations Population
Fund 2012). Having the appropriate laws against early marriage passed as legislation is
not always a successful solution because the practice often persists when unequal gender
norms value males more than females, leading families and communities to undervalue
the benefits of educating and investing in their daughters’ development, as a result men
continue to dominate the power structures in society (United Nations Population Fund
2012). Social restrictions on young women’s exercise of their rights does not allow them
an equal role in the household or their community (United Nations Population Fund
2012).
Poverty is a major factor because parents may believe that early marriage is in the
family’s best interests and that it will provide security for their daughters’ future (United
Nations Population Fund 2012). Economics conditions can play an important role,
sometimes girls are viewed as an economic burden on the family, sometimes they are
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used as a commodity to settle debts or secure favorable alliances (Hanmer and Elefante
2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012). Many girls who marry early may agree to
marriage, but coercion is involved when families pressure them to marriage for economic
reasons, or advocate marriage believing that it will improve their safety (United Nations
Population Fund 2012). Customary marriage requirements can create economic
incentives for early marriage when dowries or bride prices are considered, especially
where younger brides require a lower dowry or have a higher bride price (Hanmer and
Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Humanitarian crises are a time when family and social structures are disrupted
and girls are especially vulnerability to early marriage because of conflict or a natural
disaster (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012). Parents may
feel forced to marry off their young daughters as a last resort, either to alleviate economic
hardship in the family, or to protect her in contexts where sexual violence is common
(Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012). Examples of this
include “famine brides” in food-insecure Kenya, “bush wives” in conflict ridden Liberia,
Uganda and Sudan, and the marrying of young girls to “tsunami widowers” in Sri Lanka,
Indonesia and India as a means to obtain state subsidies (United Nations Population Fund
2012).
Education is one of the most significant variables associated with early marriage
(Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017).
Each year of secondary education may reduce the risk of child marriage by six percentage
points on average (Wodon et al. 2017). Early marriage is strongly associated with girls
who lack formal education and when girls drop out of school they become even more
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vulnerable to early marriage (United Nations Population Fund 2012). It is also the case
that when girls have poor-quality schooling, experience overcrowding, have unqualified
teachers, and experience gender-based violence at school, it can make early marriage an
viable alternative, but then the responsibilities of marriage cause girls to drop out of
school (Hanmer and Elefante 2016). Girls with a primary education are twice as likely to
marry before age 18 as those with a secondary or higher education and those with no
education are three times more likely to marry before age 18 as those with a secondary or
higher education (United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Childhood is an important experience for young women, a healthy adolescence
plays a pivotal role in shaping the life course. Early marriage denies girls their childhood
and accelerates their transition to adulthood without allowing for the identity forming
personal, emotional, and psychosocial development experiences that are an essential
component of adolescence (Marphatia et al. 2017; United Nations Population Fund
2012). Through education and socialization with peer groups girls gain critical
knowledge about reproductive and sexual health that helps them become empowered
women who are less likely to experience adverse health outcomes, for themselves and
their children (Marphatia et al. 2017; United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Early marriage clearly affects the education of girls. After a girl under 18 is
married, she rarely remains in school, marrying as a child reduces the likelihood of
enrolling in and completing secondary school, and it is among the top reported reasons
girls drop out of school in developing countries (Wodon et al. 2017). Girls with less
education also tend to average more children in their reproductive careers stretching finite
family resources, these children are negatively influenced by the lower educational
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attainment of their mothers and tend to also have lower levels of education, when
combined with the health and social impacts, this often leads to a cycle of poverty
(United Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017). Because of this strong
relationship with education, marriage age is a marker of women’s human capital and
overall status in society (Marphatia et al. 2017).
Girls married at ages under 18 are especially vulnerable to violence and
exploitation. Studies have linked intimate partner violence and marrying early, this is
especially true for very young girls, because marriage at 15 or earlier substantially
increases the chances (Wodon et al. 2017). Child marriage can be compared to sexual
enslavement because in these girls can face regular exposure to domestic and/or sexual
violence, and sometimes it leads to commercial exploitation (United Nations Population
Fund 2012). A woman’s capacity for choice depends on agency, access to resources, and
past achievements, but because early marriage often limits these via decreasing
education, which reduces the employment and income that women have access to, it
ultimately limits women’s decision-making ability in the household (Wodon et al. 2017).
It can also socially isolate them from their peers who remained in school, reducing social
capital in their network, and lowering their social status (United Nations Population Fund
2012)
Early marriage has a negative macroeconomic impact because it can affect
earnings and productivity nationally by up to 1.0% (Wodon et al. 2017). Although, early
marriage does not have a large statistically significant impact on labor force participation,
women who married under the age of 18 have expected earnings lower than women who
married after the age of 18 in adulthood (average of 9%) (Wodon et al. 2017). Wodon et
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al. also reports that early marriage typically does not directly affect household welfare
and food adequacy, but it does have an effect when you consider the indirect impact of
lower educational attainment and higher fertility (Wodon et al. 2017). The annual welfare
benefit of ending early marriage globally from reduced population growth is currently
estimated to be around $25 billion, but would grow to $566 billion annually in 2030 and
the combined annual benefit from reduced under-five mortality and reduced under-five
stunting is currently estimated at around $50 billion, but would increase to over $100
billion annually by 2030 (Wodon et al. 2017). Information related to early marriage
among boys is limited so estimated impacts are unreliable, but they may have to drop out
of school to take low-paying jobs in order to support their family and this may also
contribute substantially to the overall economic costs of early marriage (Wodon et al.
2017).
CEFM has been shown to result in increased morbidity and mortality (Nour 2006;
Nove et al. 2014; Raj and Boehmer 2013; Wodon et al. 2017). It exposes adolescent girls
to the risk of pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections, including HIV (Bruce and
Clark 2004; Clark 2004; Raj and Boehmer 2013; United Nations Population Fund 2012).
It has associations with negative maternal health outcomes, including; unplanned
pregnancy, rapid repeat childbirth, inadequate use of maternal health services. (Marphatia
et al. 2017; Nour 2006; Wodon et al. 2017). Health outcomes for the children of child
brides are also negatively affected, including an increased risk of stunted growth and
death before age five (Nour 2006; Wodon et al. 2017). Young women’s health,
autonomy, agency, knowledge, resources, and decision-making power are limited by
early marriage and their risk of intimate partner violence is increased (Farrokh-Eslamlou,
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Oshnouei, and Haghighi 2014; Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Hong Le et al. 2014; Nour
2006; Rahman et al. 2014; Speizer and Pearson 2011; United Nations Population Fund
2012)
In many developing countries failure to collect evidence to document the
prevalence and trends in early marriage make it increasingly difficult to develop effective
policies reduce it (United Nations Population Fund 2012). The absence of compulsory
registration of customary and religious marriages is especially problematic, but fees and
other impediments to late birth registration also make it difficult to get accurate data
(Hanmer and Elefante 2016). Although most countries have agreed to establish a legal
requirement of marriage registration, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women is constantly urging countries to do more to register births to enable age
verification and the effective enforce of laws on the minimum age of marriage (Hanmer
and Elefante 2016). Often, unregistered children do not officially “exist” making it
difficult to protect them from early marriage and other forms of abuse; registration
enables girls to access health care and social services, education and vocational training,
in this way birth certificates can play an indirect role in preventing child marriage
(Hanmer and Elefante 2016). Birth and marriage registration is a widespread problem,
millions of births go unregistered, making it difficult for girls to prove their actual age
and claim due protection under the law (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations
Population Fund 2012). Birth registration is a fundamental human right that must be
protected to ensure that women can exercise other rights (Hanmer and Elefante 2016;
United Nations Population Fund 2012).
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Legislation that adheres to international human rights standards (the minimum
legal age of marriage for both males and females is 18) and appropriate enforcement
measures are fundamental at the national level and below (United Nations Population
Fund 2012). Laws are formal norms that can be a very effective form of social control.
They can quickly shift behaviors when they are both strict and effectively enforced.
Research has shown that strict minimum age of marriage laws help to reduce early
marriage and adolescent fertility in developing countries (Kim et al. 2013; Maswikwa et
al. 2015)
Any course of action targeting early marriage should be focused both on girls
under 18 who are already married and young girls that are at risk of child marriage, those
living in rural areas, in poverty, and with little opportunity for education (United Nations
Population Fund 2012). It is important address those already married because they can
change the norms of their community by example, but also because even as rates of early
marriage fall, the absolute number of girls likely to marry before age 18 will remain high
as a result of population growth (United Nations Population Fund 2012). The results of
household surveys in India have showed that the rate of child marriage among girls under
age 15 is declining at more than twice the rate than among girls under 18 (United Nations
Population Fund 2012). This pattern is often seen and although the youngest girls are
delaying marriage until later ages, it is not always until adulthood, which makes it
imperative to provide policies that serve the girls who are already married to provide
them and their children better opportunities.
Regional, national, and local differences exist and will require tailored policies.
Early marriage is a global issue affecting most regions, but it is most common in South
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Asia (46% of girls marry before 18) where the data shows a large disparity in wealth and
the rate early marriage, and in sub-Saharan Africa (41%) where, the largest disparities are
associated with the level of education (United Nations Population Fund 2012). Reducing
poverty and increasing education are pathways to creating a virtuous cycle of improved
health and education that extend across generations, because those who marry later are
also more likely to invest in their children (especially female children)(United Nations
Population Fund 2012).
A primary objective for policy has been to help girls stay in school through
adolescence and to provide them with adequate knowledge of sexual and reproductive
health, nutrition, and their rights under the law (United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Countries must provide opportunities for post-primary education (Education is a right in
itself), it is especially important for rural girls that education be compulsory, cost free,
and girl-friendly, because being in school can support the perception that girls are still
children and not available for marriage (United Nations Population Fund 2012). This can
also show their families and communities positive alternatives to early marriage.
Successful programs are those that empower girls through life skills training, provide
them with safe spaces and information about their options, and develops social support
networks (United Nations Population Fund 2012). Schools and other safe spaces offer
support to help girls escape social isolation, allow them to interact with peers, and to
learn more about alternatives to marriage. Changes in knowledge, attitudes, and
behaviors around early marriage have been documented in these programs (United
Nations Population Fund 2012). There are concrete examples of how policy directed
towards education can improve young women’s outcomes. In Turkey, the compulsory
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education age was extended by three years and the share of 15-year-old girls that were
married fell by 50 percent in just five years (Hanmer and Elefante 2016).
In some places providing economic incentives to families, communities, to law
enforcement, and cultural or religious leaders would encourage them to address the issue
of early marriage (Hanmer and Elefante 2016). Governments are increasingly supporting
incentives to keep girls in school with subsidies, scholarships, or direct cash incentives to
families and these can strongly influence change. In Malawi, after just one year,
adolescent girls in a program who received conditional cash transfers were 40 per cent
less likely to be married than girls who did not (United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Because early marriage is linked to poverty, incentive-based programs (loans,
scholarships, subsidies and conditional cash transfers) can encourage or enable families
to postpone marriage and continue in school through post-primary and secondary level
(United Nations Population Fund 2012). Incentives may also include employment
opportunities for girls, microfinancing, and vocational training that can create alternatives
to early marriage to benefit girls unable to continue their education (United Nations
Population Fund 2012). Increasing economic standing can give girls’ a higher status in
their families enabling them more autonomy, but also help to alleviate the economic and
social pressures facing families that lead to early marriage (United Nations Population
Fund 2012).
Evidence suggests interventions are most effective in shifting norms when
combined with community mobilization (United Nations Population Fund 2012). A
policy that provides individual incentives for education and delaying marriage could be
strengthened by incentives paid to institutions for reaching set goals. For example, small
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cash transfers to individual families for school attendance, combined with subsidies to
schools, police departments, and cultural or religious institutions for reaching community
level goals.
Religion does play an important part in shaping norms. In religious communities,
appeals can be made to leaders to recognize ways in which their values can correspond
with global norms. Currently these are some arguments that have been made on this front.
Religious values are concerned with achieving the best outcomes. Inevitably, successful
implementation of global norms around early marriage will require the support of local
faith leaders that have substantial influence in their communities.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1

Child, early and forced marriage (CEFM) is a human rights issue that has
important consequences for the health and wellbeing of women. Around the world
individual researchers, scholars, activists, and other professionals as well as organizations
from the local to international level are engaged in efforts to end the practice. While the
incidence of child marriage has been reduced over time, this has taken place relatively
slowly (Nguyen and Wodon 2012). During the last decade it is estimated that more than
150 million girls around the world became child brides, over 14 million each year, or
more than 39,000 each day (United Nations Population Fund 2012). CEFM is known to
negatively affect the development of young women across multiple domains and is
estimated to cost societies hundreds of billions of dollars in the coming decades (Wodon
et al. 2017).
This article is focused on the social and societal aspect of this problem that so far
has been left unaddressed by asking whether the religious composition of nations
contributes to the adoption of strict laws that have been shown to effect change. I will
describe how child marriage negatively affects the health and wellbeing of young women
particularly through adolescent fertility, detail the legal efforts made by the United
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Nations to define child marriage and to regulate it through treaties requiring minimum
age-of-marriage laws. Next, I will discuss how the broader literature has not examined
resistance to the homogenization process put forward by world polity theory and make
the case for considering the cultural composition of nation-states as a factor in the process
of global norm adoption.
My unique contribution is to consider an under investigated aspect of the
problem, one that plays a role in adoption and enforcement of these laws. Kim et al.
identified the problem of recursivity as it applies to child marriage in their research on the
effectiveness of minimum-age-of-marriage laws in reducing adolescent fertility (2013).
This study sets out to determine whether culture, specifically the religious composition of
countries is associated with compliance or non-compliance to the global norm by
analyzing adoption outcomes when considering overall human development and fertility
indicators. After detailing how my analysis addresses this deficit and explaining the
methodology, I present the logistic regression models that show significant differences
between the two types of religious compositions and the adoption of strict minimum-ageof-marriage laws.
CEFM is especially problematic as a proximate cause of adolescent fertility (Nour
2006; Raj and Boehmer 2013; UNFPA 2012; Wodon et al. 2017). In most developing
countries where about 95% of the world’s adolescent births occur, the majority of
adolescent births occur within marriage (about 90%) (Raj and Boehmer 2013; UNFPA
2012; Wodon et al. 2017). Child marriage increases the risk of early pregnancy (ChandraMouli, Camacho, and Michaud 2013; Nour 2006; Raj et al. 2009; Wodon et al. 2017),
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which has the strongest impact on increased total reproduction (Placek and Quinlan
2012). Early marriage is likely the cause of at least 75% of early childbearing, depending
on the age at marriage, it increases total fertility for women by 17% to 26% (Wodon et al.
2017). Compared to those married in adulthood women who marry early tend to
experience rapid childbearing, which could be the consequence of higher desired fertility,
poorer knowledge of, or limited access to birth control, and less control over fertility
decisions (Marphatia et al. 2017; Nour 2006). After marriage, girls are likely to feel
powerless to refuse sex, or insist on condom use by their husbands, increasing their risk
of pregnancy and making them especially vulnerable to HIV, and other sexually
transmitted infections (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Nour 2006; United Nations
Population Fund 2012) Early childbearing is associated with higher risks of maternal
morbidity or complications during pregnancy and labor, such as cesarean section,
eclampsia, fistula, various infections, and these risks are generally higher as the age the
mother decreases (Akpan 2003; Marphatia et al. 2017; Nour 2006; United Nations
Population Fund 2012). Research on early childbearing shows that the adverse health
outcomes are partly attributed to young married women having lower access to quality
medical care before, during and after births (Marphatia et al. 2017).
Child marriage is defined by the United Nations as ‘when one or both of the
spouses are below the age of 18’ and any marriage of a person under the age of 18 is a
violation of article 16(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2017). This
clearly sets a global norm of 18 years old as the minimum-age-of-marriage. The 1962
Convention on Consent to Marriage (CCM), requires countries to specify a minimum
marriage age by statute law‚ that all marriages be registered, and that this law will
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override customary, religious, and tribal laws (United Nations 2019a). It also states that
when the marriageable age under a law of a religious community is lower than that under
the law of the land, the state law should prevail (United Nations 2019a). This includes
clear language prohibiting religious law from superseding, or otherwise inhibiting the
national law. It also requires registration of marriage, which is essential in combatting
child marriage, but birth registration also plays an important role. The absence of
compulsory registration of customary and religious marriages is especially problematic,
but fees and other impediments to late birth registration make it difficult to get accurate
data (Hanmer and Elefante 2016). For example, the New Humanitarian reported that in
Bangladesh in 2006 at least 90% of the population did not have birth documentation, but
the country has created an online database that dramatically increased the percentage of
the population with birth certificates and improved the government’s ability to combat
CEFM (2012). Although most countries have agreed to establish a legal requirement of
marriage registration, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women is constantly urging countries to do more to register births to enable age
verification because unregistered children do not officially ‘exist’ making it difficult to
protect them from early marriage and other forms of abuse (Hanmer and Elefante 2016).
Registration enables girls to access health care and social services, education and
vocational training, through this access birth certificates can play an indirect role in
preventing child marriage (Hanmer and Elefante 2016). Birth registration is a
fundamental human right that must be protected to ensure that women can exercise other
rights, along with marriage registration it remains a widespread problem, millions of
births go unregistered, making it difficult for girls to prove their actual age and claim due
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protection under the law (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund
2012).
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) states that the ‘betrothal and marriage of a child shall have no legal
effect’ (United Nations 2017a). The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
delineates the human rights of children and UN members who are signators to this treaty
have committed to take ‘all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolish
traditional practices prejudicial to the health of the children,’ including, but not limited to
child marriage (United Nations 1990). According to the UN, not complying with the
obligations of these conventions is a violation of human rights, and by becoming party to
these UN conventions, governments have agreed to hold themselves accountable for any
violations (2017). In many instances addressing contributing factors has a substantial
impact. For instance in Turkey, the compulsory education age was extended by three
years and the share of 15-year-old girls that were married fell by 50 percent in just five
years (Hanmer and Elefante 2016). Policy can work when countries live up to
commitments made through multiple international treaties, but national promises require
investments before becoming local realities.
The United Nations has developed a global norm of 18 years old for the
minimum-age-of-marriage and has sought to enforce it through multiple treaties (2017).
According to Martinsson global norms are behavioral expectations created at the global
level to address development challenges, but are not always easily diffused to lower
levels (2011). National governments may sign these treaties, but domestic legal
protection for young women is necessary to regulate the practice of child marriage within
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their borders. Often national laws do not enforce the global norm of 18 years old although
the country has signed a treaty (or treaties) that require it, and many countries provide
legal exceptions that allow marriage earlier than the national law allows (Melchiorre and
Atkins 2011).
One factor that enables the problem of child marriage to continually persist is that
governments frequently and flagrantly violate human rights as outlined in the treaties
they sign without penalty from the international community (Hathaway 2002).Treaty
ratification may confer symbolic human rights legitimacy to countries who are
signatories, this symbolic legitimacy makes it difficult for other countries and non-state
actors to pressure them into taking further action that will effectively protect the human
rights of people in their country (Hafner‐Burton and Tsutsui 2005).Nation-states often
make formal legal commitments as symbolic human rights compliance while violating
such agreements in practice, which Smith-Cannoy has called ‘insincere commitments’,
and Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui call ‘empty promises’ ( 2012; 2005). Meyer and Rowan
referred to this phenomena as symbolic structuring and organizational decoupling
decades earlier (Meyer and Rowan 1977). These commitments, however ‘empty’ might
empower non-state actors to pressure governments toward compliance on the basis of
their legal obligations to the international community (Hafner‐Burton and Tsutsui 2005).
There are benefits to delaying marriage and childbearing, it is effective in reducing
population momentum, allows for increases in human development between generations,
lowers desired family size and resource demands, decreases the age and power
differential between spouses, and empowers women to determine their fertility (United
Nations Population Fund 2012). It is in everyone’s interests to provide social and
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economic alternatives to early marriage and childbearing, while also supporting girls who
are already married. (United Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017).
To understand the process of homogenization of norms at the global level, the stated
goal of the United Nations ‘global norm’ of 18 as a minimum age of marriage, I refer to
Roland Robertson’s concept of ‘glocalization’(Featherstone, Lash, and Robertson 1995).
The glocalization concept holds that the local or particular cultural differences and global
or universal efforts towards cultural homogenization of nation-states or national societies
is not as straightforward a conflict as Huntington argued (Featherstone et al. 1995;
Huntington 1993). The seemingly opposing trends of homogenization and
heterogenization are filtered through nation states, which allows them to select unique
mixtures of ideas to incorporate (Featherstone et al. 1995). The result is what has been
called indigenization, glocalization, or hybridization, but many other terms have also
been used to describe particular forms of it (Alasuutari 2000; Burke 2009; Pieterse 2019;
Roudometof 2016) Widespread discussion of such processes in the literature shows that
the ability to shape global ideas in ways that connect them to different communities is a
powerful tool.
Global uniformity on child marriage is a difficult goal because of the pervasiveness
of locality. Roudometof posited that traditional practices are often contemporary
innovations of past practices used to express differences with perceived threats to
identities and traditions (2018). Robertson argues that the global is not in itself opposed
to the local, the local is within the global, and to set them apart requires the ‘invention’ of
locality including the invention of tradition (Featherstone et al. 1995). The global–local
or glocal is embodied in groups and individuals that use religious traditions to
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symbolically represent membership in an ethnic or national group through institutions
and at the individual level permeating associations and relationships (Roudometof 2018).
Cultural hybrids are formed from an amalgamation of universalism and many forms of
particularisms based on local identities (Roudometof 2018). Strategic essentialism or
nationalism whereby modern nations promote their uniqueness, depends on the existence
of national society as a cultural idea, an imagined community, even the idea of
globalization as the homogenization of nationally constituted societies is a cultural idea
(Alasuutari 2000; Anderson 2006; Featherstone et al. 1995).
Some readers may feel that anti-systemic movements as described by Wallerstein
and others do not readily apply to this particular aspect of globalization, the regulation of
marriage, because anti-systemic movements have the goal of state power and are
inherently political as defined by world-systems theory (Arrighi, Hopkins, and
Wallerstein 1986, 2012; Smith and Wiest 2012) More recently, Wallerstein included
religious movements in what he refers to as the ‘less strong varieties’ of anti-systemic
movements (Wallerstein 2016). In some cases anti-systemic movements may apply to the
problem of global norm diffusion, take for example Shite movements in the Iranian
revolution and groups such as Hizballah where conflict with the West and its worldview
is inherently anti-systemic (Di Peri 2014). Iran has not signed CEDAW, and Sharia-based
Iranian law states that the legal age-of-marriage for girls is 13 years old with parental
consent (Girls Not Brides 2019a). Judges can declare the children ‘intellectually mature’
at even younger ages and more than 5% of Iranian marriages have brides under 15 years
old, through this legal loophole families can force their daughters to marry by
convincing, or even bribing judges (Alijani 2019).
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Identifying the social factors that affect the process of global norm adoption is
important for improving the lives of millions of young women affected by CEFM. The
international community may attempt to establish norms via treaties, or other
international agreements, but governments are not acting in a vacuum; the society that
they govern matters for the implementation of global norms, preexisting characteristics,
such as unique demographics, and specific cultures, effect the formation, and
implementation of law (Buttenheim and Nobles 2009; Horne, Dodoo, and Dodoo 2013;
Kalpagam 2008; Malhotra and Tsui 1996) The process of reforming and revising laws
between the separate spheres of international, national, and local governments
(recursivity) is sensitive to various pressures (Halliday and Carruthers 2009).
One plausible contributing factor that has long been identified as an agent of
socialization and has been shown to have a significant impact on interactions between
marriage norms and the law is religion (Cranmer et al. 2016). As an institution marriage
has maintained strong ties to religion throughout history. Through international treaties,
(e.g. CEDAW) civil marriage has increasingly become a global norm (United Nations
2017a). Some countries resist this norm. For example, in Saudi Arabia without guardian
consent, a Saudi court will not recognize a marriage, this often leads to civil marriages
outside the country to remain unrecognized (Coker 2018). Within countries, religion is
often a reason for providing exceptions (Girls Not Brides 2019b).
Religion is a unifying force in identity formation and community action (Putnam
2000; Lindsay 2008). It is also consistent across the major religious paradigms (Islam,
Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism) when it comes to values relating to marriage and
fertility (Inglehart, and Baker 2000). These faith traditions include about 4.8 billion
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people, or 70% of the world’s population, and about 84% of those who are religiously
affiliated, (Pew Research Center 2012a). They all share a pronatalist paradigm,
committed to strengthening the ‘traditional/heterosexual’ family, encouraging
childbearing, encouraging traditional gender roles for women, to forbid abortion and
divorce, or any interference with high rates of reproduction (McQuillan 2004; Norris and
Inglehart 2004). These religious groups also have the highest percentages of adherents
living in countries where there are in the majority, meaning that they typically have very
large majorities (Pew Research Center 2012). Other groups do not have similarly large
demographic shares at the national level, except Buddhists in about 7 countries, they are
the most likely to live as the religious minority compared to the unaffiliated, Hindus, and
adherents to any of the Abrahamic faiths (Pew Research Center 2012). Additionally, the
association between Buddhism and fertility has been shown to be either negative or
insignificant (Skirbekk et al. 2015).
Countries composed of religiously homogeneous populations are expected to be
more likely to oppose the adoption of global norms that conflict with these values.
Although not commonly used, religious composition has been shown to be predictive of
gender norms in other cross-national studies. In research on global gender equity,
Schnabel found that when comparing the major religions, the paradigms were not
distinct, but that as the proportion of non-religious in a country’s population increased,
the gender equality increased even when accounting for development and other countrylevel factors (2015). An analysis of International Social Survey Program data showed that
unaffiliated respondents in areas with larger proportions of religious adherents had
significantly higher family values and personal religiosity scores than unaffiliated
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respondents living in areas with larger proportions of unaffiliated (Wilkins-Laflamme
2016). Conservative religious values can encourage early marriage and childbearing, and
in countries where births outside of marriage are socially unacceptable, delayed marriage
plays a significant role in the reduction of adolescent fertility (Chandra-Mouli et al. 2013;
Kim et al. 2013; Murphy-Graham and Leal 2015; Wodon et al. 2017).
This study asks if a population with a high degree of religious homogeneity is
more likely to resist adopting laws that enforce international norms as the modern
principles of popular sovereignty, and democratization have increased the importance of
numbers in politics, resulting in the prioritization of mass mobilization, and the growth of
one’s ethnic, regional or religious base (Kaufmann 2009). The international community is
now aware of the effect minimum age laws can have. Research has revealed that higher
minimum-age-of- marriage laws, if strictly enforced, reduce adolescent fertility (Kim et
al. 2007; Maswikwa et al. 2015), but research has not identified the reasons countries
vary so widely in implementing them. This research gap makes it difficult to develop
policies and messaging that encourage countries to set strict national laws setting the
minimum-age-of-marriage at 18 without exceptions. This analysis is intended to examine
the cultural component at the state level to help develop more thorough investigations
into global norm adoption across diverse societies.
2.1 MATERIALS AND METHODS
The solutions to this international human rights issue depend on identifying
pathways to desired outcomes. Country level characteristics may inhibit or enable
governments to proceed along a path towards global norm compliance in the form of
strict minimum-age-of-marriage laws. I have targeted the necessary basic legal steps
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towards reducing child marriage and adolescent fertility that have been identified by
previous research to investigate the contribution of cultural, specifically religious
composition to creating strict laws that will work to reduce child marriage and adolescent
fertility.
Because countries composed of religiously homogeneous populations are
expected to be more likely to oppose the adoption of global norms that conflict with
pronatalist and traditional values I ask a series of research questions to determine if they
are significantly different from religiously diverse countries. Does religious homogeneity
affect the adoption of international treaties in which countries promise to adopt 18 as the
minimum-age-of-marriage? I hypothesize that religiously homogeneous countries will be
significantly less likely than diverse countries to ratify treaties in which countries
promise to adopt 18 as the minimum-age-of-marriage and that this effect will hold when
controlling for region and development indicators. Does religious homogeneity affect in
the adoption of a national (later referred to as ‘standard’) minimum age-of-marriage law,
specifically a minimum-age-of-marriage that is 16 (median age), or older? I hypothesize
that religiously homogeneous countries are expected to be less likely than diverse
countries to adopt a standard minimum-age-of marriage of 16, or older and that this
effect will hold when controlling for region and development indicators. Does religious
homogeneity play a role in the implementation of minimum-age-of-marriage laws,
specifically are legal exceptions more common in homogeneous countries? I hypothesize
that religiously homogeneous countries are expected to be significantly more likely to
allow exceptions to the minimum-age-of-marriage law and that this effect will hold when
controlling for region and development indicators.
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Key Independent Variable: Religious composition by country was obtained from
Pew Research’s Global Religious Landscape (Pew Research 2016). Religious
composition, in the form of a homogeneous or diverse dichotomy, was introduced in this
analysis as an independent variable. Countries with greater than or equal to 85% of the
population that identify as adherents of a single religious paradigm, such as Christian,
Muslim, or Hindu were coded as ‘1’ indicating religious homogeneity. Countries without
adherents of any religious paradigm reaching 85% of the population, were coded as ‘0’
indicating religious diversity. This cut-point is derived from Pew Research’s Religious
Diversity Index, which classified four categories of religious diversity for countries, but
for those considered to have low religious diversity, the largest group typically accounted
for more than 85% of the population. (Pew 2014).
Dependent Variables: There are three dependent variables that represent
outcomes on the steps towards complete compliance with the international norm on the
minimum-age-of-marriage.
International Treaties: For data concerning treaty ratification the United Nations
Treaty Collection was referenced to determine which countries ratified the Convention on
Consent to Marriage, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations 2017a,
2019a, 2019b) all of which contain promises to end child marriage. These treaties were
treated as three separate dependent variables, each were coded as a dichotomous, with ‘1’
indicating ‘yes’, to ratification of treaty, ‘0’ was entered for ‘no’. Because the
overwhelming majority of countries in the sample became signatories to Convention on
the Rights of the Child (100%), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
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Discrimination against Women (98.72%) further analyses on these two dependent
variables were not conducted due to insufficient variation. Signing the Convention on
Consent to Marriage was tested as a dependent variable.
National Laws and Legal Exceptions: Data were collected on minimum age laws
from Right-to-Education.org’s report; ‘At What Age?...Are School-Children Employed,
Married, and Taken to Court?’ (Melchiorre and Atkins 2011). The dependent variables:
standard minimum age-of-marriage legally set at 16 years or older (median age) and the
provision of a legal exception to the law were dichotomously coded. A ‘1’ was coded for
‘yes’ and ‘0’ was entered for ‘no’. The decision to use the median age of 16 rather than
the norm of 18 was based on; 1) a small percentage (10%) of countries in the sample
adhered to the norm 2) these countries having set a strict law at 18 maintained that law
throughout the process, meaning after considering exceptions there was not a negative
change in the percentage who had a ‘true’ minimum age over 18. To determine the ‘true’
minimum age, the standard minimum age was used if no legal exceptions were provided,
if an exception was provided, then the minimum age allowed with the legal exception
was used. When the law, or exception did not specify an age for the minimum, the
country was coded as ‘0’ for ‘no minimum’. Setting a national minimum-age-of-marriage
over 16 and whether a legal exception to the minimum-age-of-marriage law is provided
are dependent variables included in the analyses.
Control Variables: Regional categories were taken from Pew’s The Global
Religious Landscape report (Pew Research Center 2012b). They were coded as a nominal
variable and used in analyses as a control variable. National gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita for the year 2010 was retrieved from The World Bank (2016). This was
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coded as a continuous variable and was converted to the natural log for use as a control in
analyses. Human Development Index (HDI) scores for 2010 were collected from the
United Nations Development Program and ( 2010). Total Fertility Rates (TFR) were
obtained from the United Nations Statistics Division (United Nations 2017b). Both HDI
and TFR were coded as continuous variables for use as controls.
Analytic Sample: The sample of countries used in the analyses, consists of the 156
countries (over 6.3 billion people/more than 91% of the world’s population in 2010) with
complete data available. The most commonly missing items were the dependent variables
that indicated the standard minimum-age-of-marriage. Because of confusing, or
conflicting information, the researchers who compiled this data, were unable to make a
determination as to the age ascribed by law in these countries (Melchiorre and Atkins
2011).
In Table 2.1 the descriptive statistics for the sample are stratified by the
independent variable of religious composition. The percentage of diverse countries who
signed the Convention on Consent to Marriage is slightly higher than homogeneous
countries, 36% compared to 33%. There was little difference between diverse (11%) and
homogeneous countries (10%) on a categorical variable which indicated if a country had
set a standard minimum age-of-marriage of 18 years or older. For the categorical variable
indicating that a country had a law restricting the standard minimum age-of-marriage to
16 years or older, the percentages were 73% for diverse and 76% for homogeneous
countries. A more substantial difference was found in the percentages of countries
providing a legal exception to the minimum age-of-marriage. 63% of homogeneous
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countries provide a legal exception, while only 49% of diverse countries in the sample do
so.
The analyses used a series of logistic regression models. The key independent
variable, indicating either religious homogeneity, or religious diversity was tested for
associations with the various dependent variables, each representing one of the research
questions. These dependent variables indicated: (a) whether or not treaties were ratified
(question #1), (b) whether the standard minimum-age-of-marriage was over 16 (question
#2), (c) whether there are legal exceptions provided to the law (question #3). Human
Development Index scores, the Total Fertility Rate, and the log of GDP per capita were
used as continuous control variables. Region was used as a nominal control variable.
2.2 RESULTS
Table 2.2 shows the bivariate associations between the control variables and the
dependent variables. More developed countries (based on HDI) are more likely to
conform to the international norm on marriage age in signing the Convention on Consent
to Marriage and setting a higher minimum age of marriage in a national law. Wealthy
countries are also more likely to sign the CCM and to set a higher minimum age with a
national law. Regional associations align with these relationships, Europe the most
developed and wealthiest region has a statistically significant positive relationship with
signing the CCM and a higher national minimum-age-of-marriage, while the least
developed and poorest region Sub-Saharan Africa was negatively associated with the
minimum-age-of-marriage. The Total Fertility Rate is negatively associated with signing
the CCM and the minimum-age-of-marriage. This aligns with the association found
between legal early marriage and increased adolescent fertility that has been

28

demonstrated in other studies with smaller sample sizes (Kim et al. 2013; Maswikwa et
al. 2015)
In Table 2.3. the results of the logistic regression analyses on complete models are
reported. Complete models include the independent variable (Religious Majority >=85%
of the Population), with Human Development Index score (HDI), the Total Fertility Rate
(TFR), log of Gross Domestic Product per capita (log of GDP per capita), and region as
controls. A statistically significant relationship was not found between signing the CCM
and religious composition. Religious composition isn’t associated with the adoption of
international treaties concerned with creating strict minimum-age-of-marriage laws.
Logistic regression revealed a statistically significant association between the
independent variable and the dependent variable that indicates the minimum-age-ofmarriage is set at 16, or older. The odds ratio of religious composition was 3.28*(1.21 8.81), with p<=0.05. In column 2, the Total Fertility Rate has an odds ratio of
0.33**(0.17 - 0.64) p<=0.01, meaning that a one unit increase in the Total Fertility Rate
lowers the likelihood of having a minimum-age-of-marriage law of 16 years or older by
67%. This complete model indicates that religiously homogeneous countries are more
than twice as likely to have a minimum-age-of-marriage of 16 years or older, compared
to religiously diverse countries. These results indicate that the hypothesis that religiously
homogeneous countries have lower minimum age laws is not supported, when ignoring
legal exceptions. Without considering the legal exceptions to the minimum age,
religiously homogeneous countries tend to have significantly higher minimum ages.
Logistic regression models revealed a statistically significant relationship between
the independent variable indicating religious composition and the dependent variable
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indicating that the country has a legal exception to the minimum-age-of-marriage. In the
complete model the odds ratio of religious composition is 2.78**(1.29-5.97), with
p<=0.01. This indicates that religiously homogeneous countries are 178% more likely to
provide a legal exception to the minimum-age-of-marriage law, compared to religiously
diverse countries. These results support the hypothesis. Logistic regression diagnostic
tests were conducted and revealed that the models fit the data adequately.
Laws compete with the values of their populations in norm creation and
enforcement when it comes to marriage age. This means that laws are competing to shape
the behaviors of the population with religious composition. While this study cannot
firmly establish a temporal order of affects because it utilizes cross sectional data,
religious composition does not change rapidly; for most countries it has not changed
significantly since prior to the establishment of modern minimum age laws. It was
expected that homogeneity of religious values in a population create norms for marrying
earlier in life than in religiously diverse countries and that this could potentially have
mediated the relationship between religious composition and minimum age of marriage
laws. Laws that restrict these preferences and behaviors, could cause governments to face
higher costs for enacting strict minimum-age-of-marriage laws.
The average age of first marriage was tested as a mediator for the relationship
between religious composition and the dependent variable (Minimum Age of Marriage at
16 or Older). Religiously Homogeneous countries were found to have statistically
significantly lower average ages of first marriage than religiously diverse countries
(p=0.002**). The relationship between Average Age at First Marriage and the dependent
variable (Minimum Age for Marriage at 16+) reveals a statistically significant positive
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relationship (p=0.003*), meaning that countries with higher average ages of first
marriage are more likely to have the minimum age set at 16 or higher. Using mediation
analysis to assess the extent of mediation reveals that including the proposed mediator
weakens the model’s strength of direction and statistical significance. Average Age at
First Marriage does not have a mediating effect on the relationship between the
independent and dependent variables, but instead it is also a consequence of the norms
shaping behaviors.
Statistical tests were also conducted to determine whether the type of religious
majority moderated the relationship between the independent and dependent variables,
possibly producing different outcomes among Muslim, Christian, or other types of
religious majorities. A logistic regression model was used with Christian majority as the
referent. The results indicate the type of religious paradigm is not significant.
2.3 DISCUSSION
This article was prompted by the need to understand country differences in the
adoption of strict minimum-age-of-marriage policies that reduce adolescent fertility.
These results indicate that religiously homogeneous countries are more likely to have a
higher minimum-age-of-marriage by law than diverse countries. They are also more
likely to provide legal exceptions to the minimum-age-of-marriage law. After accounting
for the legal exceptions, countries have lower ‘true’ minimum-age-of-marriage laws. The
provision of legal exceptions has a large impact, resulting in a 58% decrease in the
number of countries that have a ‘true’ minimum-age-of-marriage 16 or older after
considering legal exceptions.
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These results show that a façade of ‘empty’ commitments to global norms are
created by agreeing to treaties that require the minimum-age-of-marriage to adhere to
global norms, setting the legal minimum-age-of-marriage at or near this norm, and then
providing legal exceptions that allow for marriage at younger ages than the global norm.
Governments represent compliance with global norms to the international community,
but in practice this norm is not strictly enforced domestically. These commitments,
however ‘empty’ might empower non-state actors to pressure governments toward
compliance on the basis of their legal obligations to the international community (HafnerBurton. and Tsutsui 2005). This strategy is being is used more often by religiously
homogeneous countries (178% more often), indicating that domestic social norms that
conflict with global norms on marriage are associated with weak regulation.
This study provides support for a cultural explanation as to why some countries
adopt global norms when it comes to the minimum-age-of-marriage while others do not.
Religious composition does play a role, in that high rates of homogeneity are associated
with more legal exceptions that result in lower ‘true’ minimum ages. An important
finding in this analysis is that differences were not found between the major religions
once homogeneity of the population is considered. Discussion and analyses often center
around differences between religious paradigms, but the effects of domination of one
religion within a society has not been adequately researched. Another important finding
is than GDP is not a reliable predictor of whether or not countries take the legal steps to
prevent child marriage despite the frequent focus on CEFM as a problem for low income
countries, the laws do not reflect this. Further research is needed into the effects of
religious homogeneity to determine whether it influences other social, demographic and
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legal outcomes. In this study when using complete case analysis with control variables, it
was shown to have a statistically significant relationship with the average age of first
marriage, the likelihood of having a national law setting a minimum-age-of-marriage 16
or older, and with providing exceptions to national laws on the minimum age of marriage.
Bivariate associations with Total Fertility Rate, HDI, and GDP suggest that further
analyses could be conducted into these relationships might yield further insights.
This study has limitations because it is cross sectional and does not show trends
over time. A longitudinal study could provide more insight into the pattern of adoption of
minimum age laws. Changes in national laws regularly occur and detailed information on
all countries for an extended period of time have not been compiled into a publicly
available dataset. Another limitation of this study is that the sample does not include all
countries (due to listwise deletion), although 156 is a large sample for a complete case,
cross national study. The results may underestimate the effect of religious homogeneity
because several countries associated with high rates of child marriage (ex. Afghanistan
and Somalia) were excluded for missing data on control variables in the completed
analyses. Analysis of the available data for countries excluded from the sample comply
with the supported hypothesis of higher rates of exception provision among
homogeneous countries and the direction of the results of the other questions tested.
The issue is highly relevant because of the dangers it exposes young women to,
and it clearly has not been fully explained in this or previous research. The results of this
study do support the hypothesis that culture, specifically religious composition, may
influence the process of international norm adoption on issues informed by religious
values. In the future, religious composition can be included in analyses seeking to explain
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minimum-age-of-marriage law adoption and implementation. It would require
establishing a common metric for country level religious composition to make
comparisons across studies.
The overall cost to societies that do not enforce strict laws on the minimum-ageof-marriage is estimated to cost the world hundreds of billions in the coming decades,
and we know that when young women are married early their life chances are negatively
impacted across a spectrum of objective measures (Wodon et al. 2017). Creating
accountability to international commitments is paramount to the successful development
of millions of young women affected by this issue every year, and to the future of their
societies. Only about one in ten of the 156 countries included in this sample have a strict
minimum-age-of-marriage, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority have signed
one or more treaties promising to do so. Understanding what motivates resistance to the
international norm of 18, and the methods used for resisting, can help to identify
strategies for enforcing this norm that has been shown to reliably protect vulnerable
young women.
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Measures

Diverse
N=73

Homogeneous
N=83

Total Sample
N=156

Signatory to Convention on
Consent to Marriage
36%
33%
34%
Minimum Age >=18
11%
10%
10%
Minimum Age >=16
73%
76%
74%
Providing Exception
49%
63%
56%
True Minimum Age >=18
12%
10%
11%
True Minimum Age >=16
18%
14%
16%
Controls
Europe
34%
17%
25%
Asia Pacific
26%
23%
24%
Latin America & Caribbean
7%
28%
18%
Sub-Saharan Africa
25%
18%
21%
MiddleEast-NorthAfrica
4%
13%
9%
Mean Total Fertility Rate
2.58 (0.16)
2.95 (0.14)
2.78 (0.11)
Mean Human Development Index 0.728 (0.02) 0.675 (0.01)
0.700 (0.01)
Mean Logged Per Capita GDP
8.79 (0.19)
8.24 (0.14)
8.50 (0.12)
Note: Column Percentages Are Reported. ( ) Indicates Standard Error (SE)

35

Table 2.2 Bivariate Associations

Logistic Regression
Controls
Human Development
Index
Total Fertility Rate 2011
Logged Per Capita GDP
Asia Pacific
Europe
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East & North
Africa
Sub Saharan Africa
Independent Variable
Religiously
Homogenous

Minimum
Age of
Marriage -ofMarriage
16 or Older b

Convention
on Consent
to Marriage
b
7.68**(1.29)

Providing
Exception
b
0.38(1.08)

-0.32*(0.14)
0.37**(0.12)
-0.84(0.44)
1.13**(0.38)

4.49**(1.29)
0.61***(0.14)
0.00*(0.00)
0.54(0.47)
2.94**(1.03)

0.09(0.44)

0.60 (0.45)

-0.14(0.42)

-0.28(0.62)
-0.80(0.46)

-0.52(0.59)
-1.01*(0.42)

-0.93(0.58)
0.22(0.40)

-0.14(0.34)

0.17(0.37)

0.54(0.33)

Notes: * p<=0.05;** p<=0.01;*** p<=0.001; ( ) SE
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-0.07(0.12)
0.06(0.11)
-0.06(0.38)
0.73(0.39)

Table 2.3 Logistic Regression Models

Religious
Homogeneity
Human
Development
Index
Total Fertility Rate
Log GDPpc
Asia Pacific
Latin America &
Caribbean
Middle East &
North Africa
Sub Saharan
Africa

Convention on
the
Consent to
Marriage

Minimum-Age-ofMarriage
16 or Older

Provision of
Legal Exception

1.05(0.47 - 2.36)

3.28*(1.21 - 8.81)

2.78**(1.29 - 5.97)

2168.21*(4.481050032)
1.61(0.88 - 2.93)
0.99(0.99 - 1.0)
0.25*(0.08 - 0.76)

0.15(0.00 - 91.27)
0.33**(0.17 - 0.64)
1.00(0.99 - 1.00)
0.82(0.17 - 3.90)

0.57(0.00 - 112.04)
0.72(0.42 - 1.23)
1.00(0.99 - 1.00)
0.84(0.30 - 2.36)

0.49(0.16 - 1.50)

0.16(0.03 - 0.76)

0.53(0.17 - 1.62)

0.32(0.08 -1.39)

0.29(0.05 - 1.69)

0.30(0.08 - 1.23)

0.34(0.06 -1.87)

1.99(0.24 - 16.25)

2.10(0.42 - 10.58)

*p<=0.05;**p<=0.01; ***p<=0.001
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2

3.1 BACKGROUND
Child, early and forced marriage (CEFM) is any marriage where at least one of
the parties is under the age of 18 (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner 2020). It is a contributing factor to adolescent fertility and delayed
marriage can play a significant role in the reduction of adolescent fertility (Haub 2013).
Because early marriage disproportionately affects young girls rather than boys, and
because these girls are exposed to the risks of pregnancy and childbearing they merit the
most attention (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012;
Wodon et al. 2017). Efevbera and Bhabha recently presented a compelling argument for
using the term “girl child marriage” to make the gendered nature of the problem clear in
global public health research (Efevbera and Bhabha 2020).
When compared to women that are able to delay marriage until adulthood, women
who marry before 18 and their children are more likely to experience increased morbidity
and mortality, lower educational attainment and economic success, as well as decreased
autonomy and social status (Wodon et al. 2017). Poverty and social deprivation have both
been identified as causes and consequences of adolescent childbearing, which has also
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been associated with adverse health and social consequences for the mother and
the child (Furstenberg 2007). This cycle has historically occurred in Latin America. For
example, Chiavegatto Filho, and Kawachi (Chiavegatto Filho and Kawachi 2015) found
associations between adolescent birth rates with poverty and income inequality across
thousands of municipalities in Brazil. Because of the large number of increased risks that
child brides face, 193 countries have agreed to end CEFM by 2030 (Girls Not Brides
2019c).
3.2 THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
ON THE PREVALENCE OF CEFM
According to Lesthaeghe (2014), the SDT includes the systematic postponement
of marriage and parenthood, the rise of alternative forms of partnerships, and increased
parenthood outside of marriage. The descriptions of this transition by Lesthaeghe and van
de Kaa consistently include delaying marriage to older ages, but do not specifically
address the issue of CEFM (Lesthaeghe 2014). This connection seems apparent but has
not been made explicit in the literature. This may be due to the many differences in
nuptiality and fertility between countries in the Global North that entered the
Demographic Transition earlier, and those in the Global South which tended to begin at
higher levels of fertility and experienced more rapid population growth (Bongaarts 2009).
More than a decade ago, Fussell and Palloni (2004) identified marriage as a
primary social institution in Latin America and described marriage as relatively
unchanged even while the region has experienced consequential economic, social, and
political changes. Research since then, indicates fertility has become less related to
marriage and increasingly associated with consensual union (Covre-Sussai et al. 2015;
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Laplante et al. 2016). These changes are indicators of the Second Demographic
Transition (SDT) which is characterized by delayed marriage, delayed and reduced
fertility, and increased unmarried fertility (Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and López-Gay 2012).
Because the SDT framework centers on changes in union formation and
specifically considers increasing ages at first marriage, as well as declines in the rate of
marriage overall, it can provide important cultural/ideational explanations for changes in
CEFM. The SDT framework has been criticized for inadequately considering how
changes to traditional gender roles and advances towards gender equity potentially shapes
such changes (Zaidi and Morgan 2017). By explicitly connecting CEFM to the SDT this
shortcoming can potentially be partially addressed. By including girls as young as age 10,
this analysis will provide insight into a previously under researched age cohort, but also
determine if and how nuptiality behaviors at these ages relate to SDT changes.
Can macro level demographic trends such as the SDT can have an effect on the
prevalence of CEFM?
This analysis will determine if the data indicate that the SDT has an effect on the
prevalence of CEFM by measuring the prevalence of CEFM and identifying SDT
characteristics.
3.3 IS A DECLINE IN CEFM THE FIRST CHANGE OBSERVED AMONG SDT
BEHAVIORS?
There is potentially an association between declining prevalence of CEFM and
the emergence of SDT behaviors. A strong relationship exists between early marriage and
early fertility because of the strength of marriage as an institution for childbearing in
most societies (United Nations Population Fund 2012). There are often severe social
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sanctions for sex and childbearing outside of marriage (Hanmer and Elefante 2016;
United Nations Population Fund 2012). CEFM is intrinsically linked to adolescent births
because it encourages the initiation of sexual activity and creates intense social pressure
for girls to prove their fertility within marriages where they often have little autonomy
(Girls Not Brides 2020a). This is an important reason for assessing SDT changes in these
age groups.
It can be expected that if early marriages decline then early motherhood will also
decline because of the strength of the association between marriage and motherhood
(United Nations Population Fund 2012). The SDT predicts that both marriage and
motherhood will decline (Lesthaeghe 2014). I inspect the results to determine the timing
of the emergence of these characteristics.
Is a decline in CEFM the first change observed among SDT behaviors?
Due to the presence of social pressures to marry before motherhood I expect that a
decline in marriage will be the first SDT characteristic to emerge. Because delaying
marriage contributes to decline in marriage in these age groups, I expect that a declining
early marriage will be the first indicator that the SDT framework is emerging.
3.4 DECLINING CEFM MAY MAKE THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTION TO THE
DECLINE OF MOTHERHOOD
Marriage age is often the main determinant of fertility because the earlier a
woman gets married, the longer she will spend exposed to the risk of pregnancy during
her fecundity (Marphatia et al. 2017; Wodon et al. 2017). The availability of reliable
contraception can change this relationship by allowing for stopping when desired parity is
reached or by increasing birth spacing, but it is important to consider that women who
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marry young still have more exposure, which can (and often does) lead to more children
at the end of their reproductive careers (Marphatia et al. 2017; United Nations Population
Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017). Early marriage is likely the cause of at least 75% of early
childbearing globally (Wodon et al. 2017).
Changes to the rate of CEFM can potentially lower adolescent fertility and completed
fertility. Adolescent birth rates have declined globally since the 1990’s due to a rising age
at marriage along with other factors such as enhanced access to modern contraception
and safe abortion for young women (Santelli et al. 2017). Analyzing historical data can
show when these changes occurred in Latin America as the SDT shifted the life course of
young women.
How much does the declining prevalence of CEFM impact motherhood?
I expect that declining CEFM will have a larger impact on motherhood than other
SDT characteristics such as declining motherhood within marriage and changes in
unmarried motherhood. Declining motherhood rates are an indicator that women are
having fewer births, which can potentially lead to changes in the age structure and
population decline in the future.
In this article, I ask the following research questions. Can macro level demographic
trends such as the SDT have an effect on the prevalence of CEFM? Is a decline in CEFM
the first change observed among SDT behaviors? How much does the declining
prevalence of CEFM impact motherhood? I deconstruct the demographic record to
determine if the evidence supports the predictions of the SDT for young Latin American
women (including very young adolescents ages 10–14).
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3.5 METHODS
I use data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC): CELADE ( Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre-Population
Division of ECLAC) that was compiled on the basis of the microdata of national
population censuses (Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean
2020). The data is reported in absolute numbers. The data I use is at the regional level
which combines the available country level data. It comes from four different decades
during the period of 1980–2010 and is stratified into three age groups; those ages 10–14,
15–19, and 20–24. The original data set is publicly available.
I use basic demographic decomposition to compute statistics on marriage and
motherhood from this historical census data. The formulas and code I used are available
for reproducing the reported results and figure. I use this data on marriage and
motherhood for young women in Latin America to assess changes in three classic SDT
dimensions; Postponement of Marriage, Postponement of Motherhood, and increased
Unmarried Motherhood. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet is used to calculate the
percentage of married women, the Overall Motherhood Prevalence Rate (OMPR)(i.e.
how many women per 1,000 women are mothers), and Motherhood Prevalence Rate
(MPR) by marital status. Both a Married Motherhood Prevalence Rate (i.e. how many
women per 1,000 married women are mothers) and an Unmarried Motherhood
Prevalence Rate (i.e. how many women per 1,000 unmarried women are mothers) for
each age group. I also calculate percentages for the Share of Unmarried Among All
Mothers. These statistics on marriage and motherhood are shown in Table 3.1 below.
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The overall prevalence of marriage, the Overall Motherhood Prevalence Rate, and the
share of unmarried among all mothers are used as indicators of the three dimensions of
the SDT (Lesthaeghe 2014). They are examined over time to describe their relationships
as the SDT occurs. Analyses will describe the region from 1980 through 2010. Results
will determine if the data on CEFM indicates that declines are connected to this broader
transition and determine the contribution of SDT components to changes in motherhood
over time.
Decomposition (Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2001) was used to which type of
postponement contributed more to the changes in OMPR across decades; changes in
marriage, or changes in motherhood. This is done for each of the different age groups in
each period between decades where data was available.
The decomposition procedure used to examine the changes across decades partitions
the change in Overall Motherhood Prevalence Rate into two components. The
Contribution of the Distribution of Marriage is used to measure the contribution that
changes in the marital status composition of the population (i.e. the proportion of women
in each age group who are married versus unmarried) made to changes in the OMPR over
the decade. The Contribution of the Rate Schedule is used to measure the contribution
that changes in the motherhood prevalence rates within marital status categories (i.e. the
changes in the Married MPR and changes in the Unmarried MPR) made to changes in the
OMPR over the decade.
This will allow me to describe the changes in relationship between nuptiality and
fertility at the youngest age groups in Latin America over the last few decades. Results
will determine if the region has experienced increased postponement of marriage,
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decreased overall motherhood rates, and increased unmarried motherhood rates. These
are all classic indicators of the SDT. By decomposing motherhood rates by marital status
for these three age groups of young women I can determine which was the most
important contributor to declines in the OMPR. This determines which indicator will
have the largest impact on future demographics.
The reason for assessing SDT changes in these particular age groups is to explicitly
determine if declines in CEFM occurred along with the broader transition that has been
documented in this region (Esteve et al. 2012). Analyzing historical data can show when
these changes happened in Latin America and help to determine if the data reveal a
connection between the emergence of SDT characteristics and declines in CEFM in the
long-term. Decomposition will further expand our understanding of the contribution that
reducing CEFM has made on reducing early motherhood.
3.6 RESULTS
Analysis shows that macro level demographic trends such as the SDT can have an
effect on the prevalence of CEFM. Declines in the rates and percentages of women in
Latin America who married as children are apparent in the data. The decline in CEFM is
the first change in behaviors and has the biggest impact on future demographics among
components of the SDT. By delaying marriage until later ages these girls were often also
delaying motherhood. Fewer girls who are married in the age group 10–14 led to fewer
women becoming mothers in that age group and these effects contribute to the declines in
both marriage and motherhood in the older age groups observed in the later decades.
The data in Table 1 shows that by 1990 the SDT had already begun in Latin America.
There are sustained decreases in the OMPR and in the percentage of married women, but
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also an increased prevalence of unmarried mothers. These declines in motherhood are
directly related to the declines in marriage and are measured in the decomposition
procedure (shown below in the table as the Contribution of the Distribution of Marriage
to the Change in Overall Motherhood). The increases in unmarried motherhood were not
significant enough to sustain the OMPR as marriages declined. This trajectory indicates a
potentially sustained fertility decline. These results are robust across all age groups and
strongly support the predictions of SDT.
To interpret the decomposition results shown in Table 3.2 percentages between 50.01
and 99.99 indicate that the primary contributor to the decline in the OMPR was the
Contribution of the Distribution of Marriage. Percentages between 0.01 and 49.99 would
indicate that the primary contributor to the decline in the OMPR was the Contribution of
the of Rate Schedule. A percentage of 50.00 would indicate that the Contribution of the
Distribution of Marriage and the Contribution of the of Rate Schedule were equally
responsible for the decline in the OMPR. A percentage of 100 would indicate that the
change in marital status composition was fully responsible for the decline in OMPR.
Percentages above 100 indicate that the change in marital status composition was fully
responsible for the decline in OMPR, but additionally that the changes in the motherhood
prevalence rates within marital status categories (i.e. the changes in the Married
Motherhood Prevalence Rate and changes in the Unmarried Motherhood Prevalence
Rate) simultaneously increased.
Because the results for all age groups in all decades are 50% or higher this indicates
that the changes in the marital status composition, specifically a shift to decreasing
proportions of married women (with a historically higher motherhood prevalence) to
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higher proportions of unmarried women (with a historically lower motherhood
prevalence) is mostly responsible for the decline in the OMPR. For the percentages
between 50.01 and 99.99 the primary contributor to the decline in the OMPR was the
Contribution of the Distribution of Marriage, but the Contribution of the of Rate Schedule
also contributes the remainder of 100%. In multiple instances the percentages are higher
than 100% indicating that the Contribution of the Distribution of Marriage was fully
responsible for the decline in OMPR, but the Contribution of the of Rate Schedule was
contributing to an increase in OMPR simultaneously. In these cases, the declines in
marriage were substantial enough to overcome increases in the motherhood rates
(specifically the Unmarried Motherhood Rates) to produce continual declines in OMPR.
Because motherhood and marriage had previously been closely linked, a data
visualization (Figure 1) of their decoupling during this period is provided to demonstrate
how the SDT changed these fundamental aspects of family formation. The results shown
in this figure indicate that the contribution of married women to the OMPR has decreased
considerably over this time at the regional level. During this time the OMPR decreased
for all groups. This is represented in Figure 3.1 by the “Decline of OMPR” which shows
the OMPR of that decade as a percentage of the previous decade. Because they are all
below 100% they all indicate declines. Decreasing percentages of married women is the
most significant contributor to the changes in OMPR across decades for all age groups.
3.7 LIMITATIONS
This dataset does not have data available for each age group, in each decade, for
each country. The absence of a particular country during a given era can influence the
results of the data. To eliminate my potential biases, I include all age groups and eras
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where at least two countries are available. I utilized what is available to provide broad
context at the regional level. There is also a potential for biases in the collection of data,
or distribution of data to the source from which I retrieved it. The original data is publicly
available. The extent of data limitations has been documented in the notes of tables and
figures which indicate which specific data were included in producing them.
3.8 DISCUSSION
The results reported above show the SDT had begun in Latin America by 1990
and that sustained decreases in the percentage of married women resulted in the declining
prevalence rate of mothers (OMPR), despite an increased prevalence of unmarried
mothers in these age groups. The increases in unmarried motherhood did not fully
compensate for declines in marriage and the overall effect was a reduction in the
prevalence of young mothers. These reductions in early motherhood can potentially have
long-term consequences for the completed fertility of these women. While these results
indicate increased postponement, they could also signal an increase in never married
women and permanent childlessness if these patterns persist as these cohorts age.
Can macro level demographic trends such as the SDT have an effect on the
prevalence of CEFM? The results indicate that they can. This is important for projecting
future population demographics, but also for advocates to understand that CEFM is
impacted by macro level changes as well as more immediate factors.
Is a decline in CEFM the first change observed among SDT behaviors? Yes, and
this is beneficial to identify areas where the SDT may be occurring. As the earliest
indicator to emerge it can serve as an alert to researchers and policymakers to anticipate
other potential changes in behaviors.
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How much does the declining prevalence of CEFM impact motherhood? It has
been the most impactful in Latin America. Based on the results, declines in marriage
clearly had the largest impact among SDT characteristics. Utilizing this finding may
allow for improved projections based on rates of early marriage, which has been under
investigated, especially at the youngest ages.
Critically, early adolescents are almost always excluded from analyses of
childbearing, but the data show that they are radically different from their older
counterparts. Because little is known about this age group, it is important to recognize
that they exhibit distinct behaviors in marriage and motherhood. The data shows that they
have also experienced important changes, from 1990 through 2010 the OMPR for early
adolescents was more than cut in half. This was the most substantial decline observed (in
proportion not absolute numbers) and naturally contributes to the declines in later
decades as these cohorts grow older by reducing the number of women who are already
mothers. Because Early Adolescents (ages 10–14) have not previously been analyzed,
this research is a novel addition to the literature.
It is important to recognize the differences between age groups. The Married
Motherhood Prevalence Rate is more than 100 times higher than the Unmarried
Motherhood Prevalence Rate for Early Adolescents, about 10 times higher for Teens, and
just over 5 times higher for Young Adults. This suggests CEFM had a substantial impact
on adolescent births in the region, because the data shows that girls married before age 18
had a much higher prevalence of motherhood than their unmarried counterparts. Marriage
is still strongly linked to motherhood at younger ages, even after this tremendous shift
towards unmarried motherhood has occurred. This is evidence supporting the need for
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policies and practices that protect the human rights of young girls. It shows that
protecting them from marriage before adulthood reduces the likelihood of them becoming
mothers before adulthood. There is abundant evidence that indicate there are increased
risks to girls and their children’s health, safety, education, as well as social and economic
development when they are married or become mothers prior to adulthood (United
Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017). Understanding the demographic
effects of changes to early marriage and motherhood can help inform policymakers at all
levels.
3.9 CONCLUSIONS
This article has provided a novel approach to evaluating the impact of the SDT on
early marriage and motherhood. The results support the idea that macro level
demographic trends such as the SDT can have an effect on the prevalence of CEFM. A
decline in CEFM is the first SDT behavior observed among young women in Latin
America. The declines in CEFM made the largest contribution to the decline in the
prevalence of motherhood. It shows that the prevalence rate of CEFM declined
dramatically in Latin America during this period, although the absolute numbers of child
brides increased. The results provide evidence of postponement of marriage and
motherhood, the decoupling of marriage and motherhood, and the potential for sustained
fertility decline in Latin America.
Because the emergence of the SDT in Latin America during this period
significantly decreased the prevalence rate of CEFM and adolescent motherhood, many
young women were not exposed to the numerous associated health risks such as
eclampsia, postpartum hemorrhage, sepsis, HIV infections, and obstructed labor (Nour
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2009). The effects of these can be serious, resulting in increased mortality risks, and in
some cases lifelong morbidity. In future research these conditions can be compared to
declines in CEFM and adolescent motherhood to determine how much morbidity and
mortality were lowered as a result of this demographic shift.
Social restrictions on young women’s exercise of their rights does not allow them an
equal role in the household or their community (United Nations Population Fund 2012).
Because early marriage is a much more prevalent practice for girls than for boys, and
national laws and legal exceptions often allow for girls to be married at younger ages
than boys, it perpetuates gender inequality by denying girls their human rights (Arthur et
al. 2014; Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Melchiorre and Atkins 2011; United Nations
Population Fund 2012). This decline in the practice of CEFM across Latin America likely
improved young women’s chances to receive education, work in better occupations,
achieve economic success, and gain autonomy later in life (Girls Not Brides 2019c). In
future research these changes can also be measured to determine if this demographic shift
resulted in increases in human and economic capital.
Delaying marriage and childbearing is effective in decreasing the age and power
differential between partners, empowering women to meet their fertility goals. This
usually reduces achieved fertility, which in turn reduces the accompanying resource
demands, especially time spent on domestic tasks, which is heavily gendered (women
spend in Latin America average four times more hours performing domestic tasks than
men) (Canelas and Salazar 2014; United Nations Population Fund 2012). These changes
can enable increases in human development between generations due to the increased
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available time for women to both gain and transmit human capital to children (United
Nations Population Fund 2012).
It is important to recognize that the experiences of young women can vary substantially
by nation, sub-national region, economic, and social class (United Nations 2020). Access
to resources is distributed unequally and can impact the results of macro level changes on
individuals and groups (Sen 2000). These macro level associations identified here simply
point to patterns and do not guarantee universally positive results.
There are multiple arguments for the necessity of protecting human rights and
ongoing discussions about whether human rights and development are convergent or
divergent (Alston 2005; Andreassen and Marks 2007; McInerney-Lankford 2009). Sen
argues that “development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom”, including
those strongly associated with early marriage and motherhood, in particular, systemic
social deprivation and poverty (Sen 2000). From this perspective, protecting the human
rights of women by legislating and enforcing laws against CEFM can directly promote
development, but it also possible through cultural/ideational changes predicted by the
SDT (Girls Not Brides 2019c, 2019b; Lesthaeghe 2014; United Nations Population Fund
2012).
Although coercive efforts to achieve fertility reduction have often come at a cost
to women, a women’s rights approach allows women to exercise autonomy and may
potentially improve results across development measures safely and equitably. These
benefits extend across communities and generations, so it is in everyone’s interests to
provide social and economic alternatives to early marriage and childbearing and to
support girls who are already married (United Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et
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al. 2017). Challenging the harmful practice of early marriage requires strict national and
sub-national laws prohibiting it, birth and marriage registration systems that reach
everyone, social programs educating girls and informing communities, and systematic
action on the national level to move towards gender equality and fostering a culture that
respects human rights (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund
2012).
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Table 3.1: Marriage and Motherhood in Latin America 1980–2010
1980 Marriage and Motherhood
# of
# of
% of
Teens Age 15–19
Mothers
Women
Mothers
Married
450,547
793,386
80.70%
Unmarried
107,754 6,143,273
19.30%
Total
558,301 6,936,659
100%
Young Adults Age 20–24
Married
2,046,736 2,589,213
89.19%
Unmarried
248,195 2,930,051
10.81%
Total
2,294,931 5,519,264
100%
1990 Marriage and Motherhood
Early Adolescents Age
# of
# of
% of
10–14
Mothers
Women
Mothers
Married
13,001
39,181
44.85%
Unmarried
15,986 5,483,121
55.15%
Total
28,987 5,522,302
100%
Teens Age 15–19
Married
954,021 1,613,420
67.74%
Unmarried
454,431 17,071,311
32.26%
Total
1,408,453 18,684,731
100%
Young Adults Age 20–24
Married
4,670,770 5,894,066
82.92%
Unmarried
962,170 8,730,021
17.08%
Total
5,632,940 14,624,087
100%
2000 Marriage and Motherhood
Early Adolescents Age
# of
# of
% of
10–14
Mothers
Women
Mothers
Married
7,050
25,634
20.53%
Unmarried
27,288 15,864,411
79.47%
Total
34,338 15,890,045
100%
Teens Age 15–19
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% of
Women
11.44%
88.56%
100%
46.91%
53.09%
100%
% of
Women
0.71%
99.29%
100%
9.45%
91.37%
100%
40.30%
59.70%
100%
% of
Women
0.16%
99.84%
100%

Married
711,596 1,197,195
48.21%
Unmarried
764,512 20,099,232
51.79%
Total
1,476,108 21,296,427
100%
Young Adults Age 20–24
Married
3,870,995 4,917,598
70.76%
Unmarried
1,599,813 11,224,491
29.24%
Total
5,470,808 16,142,089
100%
2010 Marriage and Motherhood
Early Adolescents Age
# of
# of
% of
10–14
Mothers
Women
Mothers
Married
4,057
18,943
14.27%
Unmarried
24,370 13,402,761
85.73%
Total
28,427 13,421,704
Teens Age 15–19
Married
317,342
596,089
34.51%
Unmarried
602,138 16,162,779
65.49%
Total
919,480 16,758,868
100%
Young Adults Age 20–24
Married
2,110,786 2,978,427
61.94%
Unmarried
1,297,213 9,697,524
38.06%
Total
3,407,999 12,675,951
100%

5.96%
94.38%
100%
30.46%
69.54%
100%
% of
Women
0.14%
99.86%

3.56%
96.44%
100%
23.50%
76.50%
100%

Notes. AR = ARGENTINA BO = BOLIVIA BR = BRAZIL CL = CHILE
CO = COLOMBIA CR = COSTA RICA DR = DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EC = ECUADOR SV = EL SALVADOR GT = GUATEMALA
HN = HONDURAS MX = MEXICO NI = NICARAGUA PA = PANAMA
PY = PARAGUAY PE = PERU UY = URUGUAY VE = VENEZUELA
Countries with Data Available Age 10-14
1990-2000: AR, SV, GT, MX, NI, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BR, CR, EC, HN, MX, PA
Countries with Data Available Age 15-19
1980-1990: BR, CL, EC, PY, UY
1990-2000: AR, BO, BR, CL, CO, EC, SV, GT, MX, NI, PA, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BO, BR, CL, CR, DR, EC, HN, MX, PA, VE
Countries with Data Available Age 20-24
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1980-1990: BR, CL, EC, PY, UY
1990-2000: AR, BO, BR, CL, CO, EC, SV, GT, MX, NI, PA, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BO, BR, CL, CR, DR, EC, HN, MX, PA, VE
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Table 3.2: Changes in SDT Characteristics Across Decades
Change
Change in
in
Married
OMPR MPR
(per
(per
1,000) 1,000)

Age Group and
Decade
Young Adults 1980-30.62
1990
Young Adults 1990-46.27
2000
Young Adults 2000-70.06
2010
Teens 1980-1990
Teens 1990-2000
Teens 2000-2010
Early Adolescents
1990-2000
Early Adolescents
2000-2010

Contribution
of the
Distribution
Change in
of Marriage
Unmarried Change to the
MPR (per in %
Change In
1,000)
Married OMPR

1.97

25.51

-6.61%

149.78%

-5.28

32.31

-9.84%

141.09%

-78.48

-8.76

-6.97%

61.00%

-5.11
-6.07
-14.45

23.42
3.08
-62.01

9.08
11.42
-0.78

-2.80%
-3.01%
-2.06%

306.03%
278.38%
75.14%

-3.09

-56.79

-1.2

-0.55%

53.45%

-0.04

-60.86

0.1

-0.02%

114.01%

Notes. AR = ARGENTINA BO = BOLIVIA BR = BRAZIL CL = CHILE
CO = COLOMBIA CR = COSTA RICA DR = DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EC = ECUADOR SV = EL SALVADOR GT = GUATEMALA
HN = HONDURAS MX = MEXICO NI = NICARAGUA PA = PANAMA
PY = PARAGUAY PE = PERU UY = URUGUAY VE = VENEZUELA
Countries with Data Available Age 10-14
1990-2000: AR, SV, GT, MX, NI, PY, PE, VE 2000-2010: AR, BR, CR, EC, HN,
MX, PA
Countries with Data Available Age 15-19
1980-1990: BR, CL, EC, PY, UY
1990-2000: AR, BO, BR, CL, CO, EC, SV, GT, MX, NI, PA, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BO, BR, CL, CR, DR, EC, HN, MX, PA, VE
Countries with Data Available Age 20-24
1980-1990: BR, CL, EC, PY, UY
1990-2000: AR, BO, BR, CL, CO, EC, SV, GT, MX, NI, PA, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BO, BR, CL, CR, DR, EC, HN, MX, PA, VE
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Figure 3.1 The Decoupling of Marriage and Motherhood in Latin America: Period
Decomposition of OMPR Results
Notes. AR = ARGENTINA BO = BOLIVIA BR = BRAZIL
CL = CHILE CO = COLOMBIA CR = COSTA RICA DR = DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC EC = ECUADOR SV = EL SALVADOR GT = GUATEMALA
HN = HONDURAS MX = MEXICO NI = NICARAGUA PA = PANAMA
PY = PARAGUAY PE = PERU UY = URUGUAY VE = VENEZUELA
Countries with Data Available Age 10-14
1990-2000: AR, SV, GT, MX, NI, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BR, CR, EC, HN, MX, PA
Countries with Data Available Age 15-19
1980-1990: BR, CL, EC, PY, UY
1990-2000: AR, BO, BR, CL, CO, EC, SV, GT, MX, NI, PA, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BO, BR, CL, CR, DR, EC, HN, MX, PA, VE
Countries with Data Available Age 20-24
1980-1990: BR, CL, EC, PY, UY
1990-2000: AR, BO, BR, CL, CO, EC, SV, GT, MX, NI, PA, PY, PE, VE
2000-2010: AR, BO, BR, CL, CR, DR, EC, HN, MX, PA, VE
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3

Child, early and forced marriage (CEFM) is defined as marriage where one or
both parties are under the age of 18 (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner 2020). CEFM is a fundamental violation of human rights and although
this practice is prohibited by multiple United Nations’ treaties, yet it still persists across
the world (UNFPA 2012). The practice is much more common among girls than boys and
millions of underage girls are married each year, including tens of thousands in the
United States (Unchained At Last 2020; UNFPA 2012).
CEFM occurs across the world within a wide variety of sovereign states, cultures,
and religions (Girls Not Brides 2019b). It is driven by multiple factors, gender inequality,
poverty, traditional practices, and insecurity (Girls Not Brides 2019b; United Nations
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2020). Annually about 15 million girls
around the world become child brides (Khokhar 2017). I am interested in determining
how a nation’s relationships with international institutions impacts the adoption of global
norms on CEFM.
Since 1979, Iran has sought to end external interference by removing the Pahlavi
regime and remaking Iranian society in a process that demarcates two types of norms and
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values; “internal” and “external” (Holliday 2020). The goals have been described as
focused on territorial, cultural and political independence, with an explicit resistance to
foreign intervention in the name of anti-imperialism (Adib-Moghaddam 2005; Holliday
2020). The Islamic Republic uses a subaltern identity to maintain legitimacy within the
country and as a leader among the wider Islamic world by defending against outside
influence (Holliday 2020).
Iran stands apart from other countries around the globe, including those in close
proximity geographically and culturally because the national law in Iran provides
significantly less protection against CEFM than most other countries (as does the U.S.).
In the background section I look to identify social factors that contribute to the
persistence of CEFM in Iran, to review Iran’s status as party to international treaties,
provide details on its national laws, contextualize gender and age differences, discuss the
role of endemic customary practices, and identify inadequacies in the registration of
births and marriages.
I then describe the available data from Iran and the methods I use to answer the
following research questions: 1) How often is the global norm on the minimum-age-ofmarriage violated in Iran? 2) What is more common among child brides, marriage to
another child, or to an adult? 3) How large are the age differences between spouses
among child brides in Iran? 4) How often are the Iranian norms violated? 5) Is data on
child brides disproportionately incomplete, compared to adults? The goal is to reveal how
CEFM has persisted in a country that resists global norms. In this case the exception
functions as the norm, where previous research has demonstrated that strict laws (those
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that reflect a global norm) have a significant effect on reducing the practice and the
adolescent fertility associated with it (Kim et al. 2013; Maswikwa et al. 2015).
4.1 BACKGROUND
Several social factors contribute to the persistent prevalence of CEFM in Iran: 1)
the predominance of Islamic religious law (Sharia) that sets the legal age of marriage at
13; 2) the perception that marriage provides protection against the possibility of the girl
harming the family’s honor; 3) the customary practices of Blood marriages (a means of
conflict resolution between tribes) and Navel String marriages (a form of arranged
marriage at birth) (Girls Not Brides 2019a; Shakib 2017). Additionally, the government
has an adversarial relationship with international organizations and promotes resistance to
international norms as symbolic of its sovereign power and influence within the MENAP
region. Shite movements in the Iranian revolution and groups such as Hizballah where
conflict with the West is part of an inherently anti-systemic worldview are emblematic of
this resistance (Di Peri 2014). Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the government has
adopted a pronatalist public stance, although family planning policy has wavered due to
economic and demographic trends and different affects have been observed among
varying social groups, the most consistent factor for fertility has been women’s education
(Erfani and McQuillan 2009; Torabi and Baschieri 2010).
4.2 TREATIES
Iran is an outlier globally (along with the U.S.) in its refusal to be party to
multiple United Nations’ treaties prohibiting CEFM and others that support the
registration of births and marriages (United Nations 2021). In particular, The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) which
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most of its counterparts in the MENAP region have joined (except Somalia and Sudan)
(United Nations 2021). Iran also has not joined the Convention on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (CCM) and only four of the
other twenty three MENAP countries have done so (United Nations 2021). Although Iran
is party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), it reserved the right not to
apply any provisions or articles of the Convention that may be in contravention with
domestic laws and Islamic standards, which in principle, means that Iran could comply
with the CRC without changing existing national laws and policies that affect children
(UNICEF 2005). Additionally, Iran has not joined the Convention on Reduction of
Statelessness, which is problematic for the identification and protection of young girls
(UNICEF 2005; United Nations 2021). The only MENAP countries that are party to this
treaty are Libya and Tunisia (which did so with reservations) (United Nations 2021). For
further information see Table 4.1.
4.3 NATIONAL LAW
In Iran the judiciary follows Islamic law (Sial and Khan 2019). According to
Sharia law boys at 15 years old and girls at the age of 9 become sexually mature,
although menarche is viewed as the time of transition to adulthood for girls (Asghari
2019; Matlabi 2013; World Bank 2010). The Quran refers to attaining adulthood or
attaining puberty as al-bulugh (Asghari 2019; Esak 2012). In Iranian civil law, the
minimum marriage age for girls is 13 and 15 years for boys, but a judge can provide legal
exceptions allowing younger children to be married (Matlabi 2013). Understanding the
law in Iran, especially its application in early marriage is difficult from any perspective
other than Islamic law (Asghari 2019; Tremayne 2006). Iran Human Rights Monitor
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reported an illustrative quote from Tayyebeh Siavoshi, a Majlis deputy, “In some courts,
judges who want to endorse marriage of girls under 13 years of age, show them a gold
ring and ask them if it is a gold ring in order to determine whether the girl has reached
rational maturity.” (2018). While an anecdote like this might be perceived by some as
hyperbole, research shows that it is reality for many girls in disadvantaged regions
(Ahmady 2016). Legal exceptions to the minimum age-of-marriage in Iran do require a
court decision, but are not a strong legal precaution in practice, and do not follow a
uniform procedure (Ahmady 2016; Asghari 2019).
Iran does not have legal protections against CEFM. Even in countries where
strong legal frameworks exist, with laws setting the minimum age-of-marriage at 18, high
rates of child marriage often persist when enforcement of such laws is weak (Hanmer and
Elefante 2016). Among the reasons for weak implementation of protections within
countries are inadequate awareness and training among law enforcement officials which
is does not apply here because laws in Iran permit it; corruption, which is reportedly
widespread at the judicial level in Iran; a prevalence of customary practices and traditions
related to marriage endemic in Iran; as well as inadequate formal registration of
marriages and births, all of which apply to the situation in Iran (Asghari 2019; Hanmer
and Elefante 2016; Stone 2020).
4.4 GENDER AND AGE DIFFERENCES
Most cases of CEFM occur with underage age girls rather than boys and these
girls are mostly married to adults (Girls Not Brides 2019a). Little research has been
conducted on boys married as children, but the risks boys are exposed to are more limited
than those experienced by girls, and the prevalence of boy child marriages are
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significantly lower (global estimates indicate 4.5% of boys and 21.2% of females are
married as children) (Gastón, Misunas, and Cappa 2019; Misunas, Gastón, and Cappa
2019). Additionally, many countries have laws that allow girls to be married at younger
ages than boys, including Iran (Khokhar 2017; Matlabi 2013; Sial and Khan 2019).
Research suggests that demographic determinants of the age difference, such as existing
age constraints on the pool of potential partners, are less relevant than social structural
factors, and furthermore that age differences are often interpreted as indicative of gender
inequality at the individual and societal level (Casterline, Williams, and McDonald
1986). Girl children who are married tend to have spouses who are much older (Clark,
Bruce, and Dude 2006; UNFPA 2012). For instance, available data in the U.S. suggest
about 77% of child brides are married to adults (Unchained At Last 2020).
Gendered expectations for sexuality, especially sexual initiation, are intrinsic to
this disparity. Early marriage has appeal in societies with traditional values, and Muslim
societies in particular, because it functions as protection for the family’s honor by
ensuring the girl’s virginity before marriage (Awwad 2011; Shirazi 2009). This is a
mechanism of social control and like other practices of virginity control, it violates the
basic human rights of women, attempts to control the sexual behaviors of women, and
can lend legitimacy to multiple forms of gender-based violence (Awwad 2011). This
gendered ideology of divergent expectations is not only reflected in practice, but also
strongly alters perceptions of roles within a “culture of honor” (Ahmady 2016; Awwad
2011; Motamedi et al. 2016). For example, research in Iran showed that 43% of the
males felt that it was important for a female to be a virgin, but even more females (61%)
supported the same sentiment (Motamedi et al. 2016).
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Marriage is the only socially and legally acceptable situation for sexual
relationships to occur in Iran, where sex outside a marital relationship is punishable by
100 lashes, but the punishment varies depending on the specific case (Islamic Republic of
Iran 2006; Motamedi et al. 2016).. This is recognized across society, although younger
generations are becoming more sexually active in practice, which leads to increased
incentives for parents to encourage marriage early, or for children to seek marriage at
early ages (Ahmady 2016). The legal system is quite coercive when enforcing
punishment for violations of these sexual norms. Unmarried mothers are automatically
suspected of “zina” (adultery) and according to the Islamic Penal Code, these women
may be held legally responsible and thus liable to punishment (a woman may be flogged
100 times for bearing a child out of wedlock) (UNICEF 2005).
4.5 CUSTOMARY PRACTICES
Customary practices are among the reasons that Iranian girls are married at young
ages in violation of their human rights. When combined with poverty, traditional
practices can compel parents to marry off their daughters early. In one such practice the
bride price “Mehr’iah” is often higher for younger girls which incentivizes the marriage
of extremely young girls (Erfani and McQuillan 2009). One mother was quoted frankly;
"families sell their girls to make money" (Matlabi 2013). Parents can also form
economically beneficial social and political ties while forgoing the continuing costs of
caring for the child (Ahmady 2016; Girls Not Brides 2019a; Montazeri et al. 2016; de
Silva-de-Alwis 2008). These costs are increased by a lack of educational opportunities
for girls in some areas of Iran; Masoume Aghapour Alishahi, representative of the
women’s faction at the regime’s parliament, was quoted: “Unfortunately, due to the

65

absence of high schools in villages, girls are unable to continue their education beyond
the primary level; and are consequently forced by their parents to get married.” (Iran
Human Rights Monitor 2018).
A female parliament member recently acknowledged that there are 24,000 young
widows under 18 years of age in Iran (Iran Human Rights Monitor 2018). This is an
especially dangerous situation for young widows because they are often forced into
temporary pleasure marriages, known as muta’as or “minute marriages” that in practice
enables prostitution in a sexually restrictive society with the blessing of a religious ritual
(Al-Maghafi and Wells 2019; DeJong et al. 2005; International Centre for Missing &
Exploited Children 2013). Along with opportunities to profit comes exploitation, and the
growing demand for young girls to participate in muta’as has given rise to a system of
recruitment (Al-Maghafi and Wells 2019). This traditionally Shia practice has been
encouraged by Iranian political leaders since the revolution, but has become more
common in Sunni culture and in neighboring MENAP countries such as Iraq (Al-Maghafi
and Wells 2019; DeJong et al. 2005). It removes “honor” from girls making it difficult
for them to escape the exploitative cycle. Due to conflicts in the MENAP region, there
are increasing numbers of widows, orphans, and refugees that are becoming ensnarled in
this industry (Al-Maghafi and Wells 2019).
Another customary or traditional practice in Iran and the MENAP region treats
girls as an economic commodity to resolve conflicts between families or tribes. Blood
marriages known as al-Fusliya in Arabic and badal khueen (blood substitute) or jin be
xwên (woman-for-blood) in Kurdish, allow poor people who cannot pay blood money to
marry off their daughters in payment (common preference is for younger girls) (Payton
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and Aljabiri 2015; Shakib 2017). The bride (in many cases a child) may receive harsh
treatment from the family in revenge for their kinsman, and live without the status or
rights of an official wife (Payton and Aljabiri 2015). Other MENAP countries have taken
legal steps to curve similar customary practices; for instance, the Pakistani Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act 2004 criminalizes “sawra” (the act of giving females for marriage as
part of a compromise in dispute settlement between families or clans) (Hanmer and
Elefante 2016).
Iran also has what is known as "Navel string marriages", which are a form of
arranged marriage where a newborn's umbilical cord is cut symbolically, usually
pledging marriage in to a cousin, or a more distant relative (Ahmady 2016; Shakib 2017).
Similar traditions in other cultures revolve around arranged marriage at birth, or during
early childhood, and this still contributes significantly to the prevalence of CEFM
globally (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell 1983; Girls Not Brides 2019b). Research in
Pakistan found that in Muslim society there are certain sociocultural advantages of
consanguineous marriages, but these marriages are “perceived to be exploitative as they
perpetuate the existing power structure within the family” and women reported it led to
their in-laws exercising coercive power over them (Hussain 1999).
The marriage of underage girls in the Islamic Republic is still supported by clerics
and recently a parliamentary motion banning child marriage received very little support
by legislators although the public has become more outspoken (Radio Farda 2019).
Hassan Nourozi, The spokesperson of the parliament’s legal commission defended the
commission’s rejection of the bill by saying “a 15- year- old girl is not considered a child
… and is fit to marry,” (Nima 2019). The practice is promoted in part by the behavior of
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leadership in the Islamic Republic, its founder, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, married a 15- year- old girl at the age of 27, and Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s
current president, also married a 15- year- old girl when he was over the age of 20 (Radio
Farda 2019). This “golden age” resonates with families across the country as “residents
of the village have got an opinion that girls should marry before age of 15” (Matlabi
2013).
4.6 REGISTRATION
In addition to an inadequate legislative framework to prohibit CEFM, the
country’s civil registration system is also notoriously ineffective at recording all births
and marriages, especially the marriages of young girls living in rural areas where the
practice is said to be most prevalent (Girls Not Brides 2019a). Birth registration is a
fundamental human right that is essential for protecting children in many ways, but is
extremely important to efforts to reduce CEFM (Girls Not Brides 2020b; Hanmer and
Elefante 2016). At the turn of the last century, it was estimated that more than 40% of all
babies born in the world annually were unregistered and data from the same time showed
that about 13% of all births in Iran were not registered (UNICEF 2005). This unmet need
in Iran was further demonstrated by the fact that during a brief campaign across remote
districts (Sistan and Baluchistan) of Iran in 2004, birth registration tripled in comparison
to the same period in the previous year (UNICEF 2005).
Since 1918 Iran has had a law that stipulates that all births must be registered
within 15 days (UNICEF 2005). The registration of both births and marriages are legally
required, but the legal system is much more accessible to men (Hanmer and Elefante
2016; Islamic Republic of Iran 2006; UNICEF 2005). This is problematic because the
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father has more power, including the legal authority to register the birth of a child and to
apply for a birth certificate (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Islamic Republic of Iran 2006).
Similarly obstructive legal hurdles to birth registration are present in other MENAP
countries such as in Egypt, where the father can always register the birth of a child, but
the mother may do so only if she provides proof of marriage (Hanmer and Elefante
2016). These restrictions exemplify “legal gender differences” that affect women’s ability
to exercise their rights and puts limits on their economic prospects, for example, by
making it difficult for women to own property or open a bank account (Khokhar 2017).
In cases where the parents’ marriage is not registered, both parents must appear
before the civil registrar to register a child’s birth, potentially restricting registration of
children whose fathers for any reason are unable to be present (Hanmer and Elefante
2016; Islamic Republic of Iran 2006). Because unmarried mothers are suspected of
“zina” (adultery) there is a strong disincentive for unwed mothers to attempt to register
the birth of a child (UNICEF 2005). The gendered power dynamics of legal systems can
contribute to the persistence of CEFM in many different ways.
A further imposition is that birth registration is not free of charge. The first copy
of a birth certificate is 20,000 Iranian Rials, to further exacerbate the cost issue there is a
50,000 Rial fee the first time a birth certificate is lost, and an additional 10,000 for any
subsequent losses which can leave those unable to afford it without important documents
(UNICEF 2005). These costs and additional burdens of travel make registration less
accessible in poor and rural provinces (Girls Not Brides 2019a; UNICEF 2005). There is
a direct connection between a family’s inability to afford a document that can protect the
rights of a girl to that girl entering into an early or forced marriage (Hanmer and Elefante
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2016). For instance, a recent qualitative study of child brides in Ahvaz reported that most
participants had come from families with socioeconomic difficulties and this was cited as
a fundamental reason that they were married early (Montazeri et al. 2016).
Government efforts to administer these services can be stimulated by raising
awareness of the benefits of registration. Cost reduction and coverage expansion can be
achieved by simplifying procedures and by ensuring that women, regardless of marital
status, are able to register the birth of a child. Iran doesn’t ensure that if parents fail to
register children that government officials have means and motives to secure registration.
Children born of non-citizens cannot obtain birth certificates and Iran has not ratified The
Convention on Reduction of Statelessness 1961 (UNICEF 2005; United Nations 2021).
Children cannot apply to change their nationality or acquire the nationality of their
mothers (Islamic Republic of Iran 2006). Each one of these inadequacies contribute to
CEFM.
Registration of marriages and births are an important to determine if marriages are
happening to underage girls and to prevent them, but also to allow for legal and financial
redress in cases of divorce and widowhood (Girls Not Brides 2020b; Hanmer and
Elefante 2016). These records are not always available, especially in developing
countries, but even in the United States more than a dozen states do not even track the
data (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Unchained At Last 2020). Access to reliable data on
CEFM in Iran is especially challenging and the validity of the available statistics is
disputed because of the prevalence of unregistered births and marriages (Asghari 2019;
UNICEF 2005). The Iranian government does not consistently provide precise
information on the age of marriage at the national and subnational levels (Asghari 2019;
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UNICEF 2005). There are a variety of unofficial sources available, including news media
reports and non-governmental human rights organizations (NGO’s), but these sources do
not always follow the same policies, practices, and procedures for gathering data as is
used in most peer reviewed research (Asghari 2019). This situation leads to the reports of
news agencies often becoming sources for statistics used in research and those results are
interpreted cautiously (Asghari 2019).
The lived reality of Iranian women’s lower social status reflects the patriarchal
religious beliefs that are the foundation of formal and informal norms in Iranian society
(Sial and Khan 2019). This is especially true for girls in poverty, rural and remote areas,
with limited education, or those from minority groups (Ahmady 2016; Harbitz and
Tamargo 2009). Recent reports on the number child marriages in Iran are concerning
even though they are more than likely understating the problem (Center for Human
Rights in Iran 2015). This is due to the previously noted issues of registering births and
marriages in Iran, and while these documents are essential for protecting the rights of
girls in daily life, their absence also limits our ability to quantify the prevalence of the
practice (Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Selim 2019). Furthering complicating the picture is
the corruption that allows documents to be created or modified to meet age requirements
for a cost (Ahmady 2016; Asghari 2019).With the available data described below I will
show how Iran’s pattern of inaction to work towards reducing CEFM also further
obfuscates the lived reality of child brides in Iran. I rely on the words of a 13-year-old
child bride from Hormuz; “We have no other choice,” she said, when asked to explain
how she was married so young (Nima 2019).
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4.7 DATA AND METHODS
I use data from IPUMS-International (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
International), the world's largest collection of publicly available individual-level census
data. IPUMS-International data are samples from population censuses with all identifying
information removed (Minnesota Population Center 2020). In this study I use the 2011
sample from Iran. Because the variables have been given consistent codes, making crossnational and cross-temporal comparisons is possible (Minnesota Population Center 2020).
This microdata is organized into households, which allows me to study “the
characteristics of people in the context of their families or other co-residents”(Minnesota
Population Center 2020).
I reduced the sample to women only (n= 738,951). In the sample there were
382,838 currently married women, 8,932 reporting they were separated/divorced/spouse
absent, 46,339 were widowed, and 62 missing marital status. The mean age difference
between spouses was 5.03 years.
206,725 of these are females are under the age of 18. 6,100 were currently
married, 66 were separated/divorced/spouse absent, 44 were widowed, and marital status
was missing for 14 girls. The mean age difference between spouses of child brides was
8.68
Because I am interested in comparing the violations of the global norm (age 18)
and Iranian norm (Sharia. and Iranian civil law permit those age 13 and older), age
differences between spouses, and the nuptiality characteristics (including missing data)
among women in Iran I created descriptive statistics and new variables using the original
dataset. I utilized descriptive statistics to answer the following: 1) How often is the global
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norm on the minimum-age-of-marriage violated in Iran? 2) How often are the Iranian
norms violated?
To illustrate to frequency and demographic characteristics of child brides in the
sample I use a Violin Plot. These plots build on Tukey's original box plot. The violin plot
adds the information available from local density estimates to the basic summary
statistics inherent in box plots (Hintze and Nelson 1998). The combination of summary
statistics and density shape into a single plot is a useful tool for data analysis and
exploration (Hintze and Nelson 1998). The violin plot I use includes a marker for the
median of the data, a box indicating the interquartile range, spikes extending to the upperand lower-adjacent values and is overlaid with a density, estimated by kernel density
(Winter and Nichols 2008). The advantage of the violin plot is that in addition to
summary statistics it also shows the entire distribution of the data. In Stata search,
searching for violin plot will allow you to download packages to produce these plots. The
command vioplot executes the plot.
To further analyze the differences, I created a series of dummy variables that can
be used to test the statistical significance of the differences which may help to explain
how relevant these differences are and to answer the remaining research questions. The
first dummy variable is “child bride”. If the woman or girl’s age was under 18 (the legal
age of marriage under the global norm) and her marital status was “married/in union”,
“separated/divorced/spouse absent” or “widowed” the variable was coded as 1. If the
girl’s marital status was recorded as either “single/never married” or “unknown/missing”
then it was coded as 0. Regardless of marital status age if the woman or girl’s age was 18
or older was coded as 0.
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The second dummy variable is “violates Iranian norm”. If the woman or girl’s age
was under 13 (the legal age of marriage under the Iranian civil code) and her marital
status was “married/in union”, “separated/divorced/spouse absent” or “widowed” the
variable was coded as 1. If the girl’s marital status was recorded as either “single/never
married” or “unknown/missing” then it was coded as 0. Regardless of marital status age
if the woman or girl’s age was 13 or older the case was coded as 0.
The third dummy variable is “husband’s age missing”. If the husband’s age was
missing the variable was coded as 1, if the husband’s age was available, it was coded as
0. Missing data is a recurrent problem for data on CEFM globally and one endemic to
Iran (Girls Not Brides 2019a). I also created an “age difference” variable. This variable
quantifies age differences between spouses by subtracting the age of the wife from the
husband’s age. This age difference is used as an indicator of gender inequality and power
differences in conjugal projects (Barbieri, Hertrich, and Grieve 2005; Casterline et al.
1986). This enables me to answer research question 4) How large are the age differences
between spouses among child brides in Iran? In this analysis only girls with husband’s
age available were used, leaving only 3,710 child brides whose ages ranged from 12–17.
Missing data and underreporting are recurrent problems for data on CEFM globally and
one endemic to Iran (Girls Not Brides 2019a).
A Pearson’s correlation was also run to assess the relationship between age of
child brides (only those ages 12-17 with data available) and the age differences between
spouses. This provides further context for research question 4) How large are the age
differences between spouses among child brides in Iran?

74

I used a logistic regression model to determine whether being a child bride or
being under the legal age according to Iranian civil law increased the likelihood of the
husband’s age to be missing from the dataset. An indicator of whether the household was
located in a place designated as urban or as rural (Urban) was used as a control variable.
This procedure produces results used to answer research question 5) Is data on child
brides disproportionately incomplete, compared to adults?
4.8 RESULTS
Utilizing this data allowed me to answer the following research questions.
How often is the global norm on the minimum-age-of-marriage violated in Iran?
Just under 3% of girls under 18 were currently married in 2011 (6,100).
Additionally, 110 girls were already divorced or widowed before reaching adulthood (age
18). So about three out of every 100 girls (females under age 18) were married at an early
age in violation of the global norm (18 years-old). Results are reported in Table 4.2
Nuptiality Status, Age Differences Between Spouse, and Missing Data by Age Among
Females in Iran (2011).
After observing that the data showed no girls as married under the age of 10, it
seemed appropriate to focus in on a narrower age range. In 2011, 141 girls aged 10 and
11 years old were currently married (0.65%), but in both samples none of the husbands’
ages were not recorded. This indicated that there was some hesitancy to report the age of
the husband of child brides at these ages.
In 2011, there were 68,962 girls in the 12–17 age range in the sample, 8.78%
were married, divorced, or widowed and only 0.02% were missing marital status. About
9 out of every hundred girls ages 12-17 were married in violation of the global norm.
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This is a significantly lower percentage than the reported 21.5% of girls aged 15-19 years
who were currently married or in union in Iran during 2010 and the 17% of women of all
age who were married before age 18 (UNICEF 2020). So when looking at only ages 1517 a sharp increase is apparent, in 2011 17.23% (0.24% widowed or divorced, and only
0.02% were missing marital status) were currently married.
What is more common among child brides, marriage to another child, or to an adult?
Based on the available data it is much more common for child brides in Iran to be
married to an adult. In the 2011 sub-sample of child brides whose husbands ages were
recorded, 98.14% were married to adult men (age 18+) rather than to other children. This
is consistent with the 2006 sub-sample where 97.05% of child brides were married to an
adult (see appendix).
How large are the age differences between spouses among child brides in Iran?
In the combined sample, the mean age difference between spouses among only
adult married women (n= 645,541) was slightly lower than the overall (including married
children) mean, 5.13 years. For child brides (n= 7,809) the mean age difference between
spouses was much larger, 8.45 years.
A deeper look at what the data among child brides in 2011 shows that the median
age of the husband was 24 years old (average age 24.82). In 2011, age difference between
spouses ranged -4 and 84 years, the median age difference between child brides and their
spouses was 8 years (average 8.68 years). In the 2011 sub-sample, about 3% of girls had
a husband that was at least 20 years older. For reference, only 1% of married couples of
all ages in the United States have an age gap of 20 years or more (US Census Bureau
2013).
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A Pearson’s correlation was run to assess the relationship between age of child
brides (only those ages 12-17 with data available) and the age differences between
spouses. The results of this test showed in the 2011 sample there was a small negative
correlation r(3,708) = -0.1547, p<0.000, with the age of the child bride explaining about
2% of the variation in the age differences between spouses. It is important to note that
large percentages of missing ages are likely impacting this particular analysis.
Violin plots were used to create visualizations of the age differences in Figure 4.1 (2011).
The figure shows that age difference can vary substantially by the age of the girl.
Two groups can be qualitatively distinguished in this regard. Among the 12-year-old
brides’ husbands were 16 years older on average in 2011. In the older age groups (those
that meet the minimum age of marriage according to Sharia and Iranian Civil Law) we
see smaller age differences. 13-year-old brides’ husbands were 11.81 years older on
average in 2011. For 14-year-old brides’ husbands were 10.95 years older on average.
Among the older age cohorts, 15-, 16- and 17-year-old brides’ husbands were 8.98 , 8.79,
and 8.00 years older on average. The shrinking age differences as girls ages increase are
what we would expect to see if the distribution of husband's age was the same. While we
must consider the smaller sample size of the 12-year-old group, the pattern of larger age
differences appears in both samples, 2006 and 2011 (see appendix).
How often are the Iranian norms violated?
Among the 148,823 girls under the age of 13 in the 2011 sample, 254 (0.17%) are
currently married, there are 15 girls (0.01%) already divorced or widowed, and only two
are missing marital status. This indicates that at least 1.8 out of every 1,000 girls in the
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sample were married in violation of the minimum-age-of-marriage according to Sharia
and Iranian civil law.
Furthermore, when looking only at the ages where legal exceptions to Sharia and
civil law are allowed we see increased frequency of CEFM. Among the 43,258 girls ages
9-12 years old in the 2011 sample the number of currently married is 254 (0.59%) while
the missing cases were only 2. We can see that in 2011 about one in every 170 girls ages
9-12 are currently married.
Is data on child brides disproportionately incomplete, compared to adults?
As indicated in the previous sections missing marital status has impacted analyses
of these samples, this is further confirmed by comparing the situation to missing data of
adults. The absolute numbers and percentages of women missing marital status are both
higher among girls (those under 18) than adults. Missing ages were very common for the
husbands of child brides, 40.28% were missing in 2011.
A series of logistic regression analyses of currently married women controlling
for urban-rural status showed that missing data on the husband’s age was associated with
being a child bride and that being underage according to Iranian civil law increased the
odds ratio. Another logistic regression was performed to determine age difference
between spouses based on status as child bride and it also controlled for urban-rural
status. Logistic regression analyses on the 2011 sample of currently married women
(n=382,838), showed that being underage according to Iranian civil law (versus being of
legal age 13<), increases the likelihood of husbands age missing (which indicates
whether it was missing) significantly, odds ratio 117.67, p< 0.000. Being a child bride
(versus being a married adult woman age=18<) increases the likelihood of husbands age

78

missing (which indicates whether it was missing) significantly, the odds ratio is 11.92, p<
0.000. For comparison, being from a rural area (versus being from an urban area) also
increases the likelihood of the husbands age missing (which indicates whether it was
missing) significantly, but the odds ratio is 0.78, p< 0.000.
The frequency of missing data for all child brides and especially among the
younger ages (10-12) is an important finding. It can be interpreted as indicative of
increased hesitancy to report the age of the spouse. This is important because 10-12 yearold girls are not only underage according to the global norm, but also under Sharia law
(Girls Not Brides 2019a; Islamic Republic of Iran 2006). These findings suggests that
global norms are violated up to about 17% of the time, that child brides are married to
adults 98% of the time, that age differences are larger on average for child brides (and
especially those under age according to Sharia), and that missing data is much more
common among child brides than married adult women. It is apparent that when the local
and/or traditional norm is being violated the age difference is often even more extreme
and that the recording of important details is much more limited.
4.9 DISCUSSION
This research describes the persistence of a harmful gendered practice, founded
on religious and cultural traditions. I have attempted to reveal a hidden reality. Life for
young girls in Iran comes with certain risks. In a country where women had gained so
much, a social revolution occurred. While the West saw it on their television screens, the
girls of Iran have lived it, and their children have lived it. The question becomes how
many more girls will live it.
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Throughout the introduction I explained the social structures that allow CEFM in
Iran to persist; a resistance to international treaties and norms, a legal system dominated
by Islam, a set of cultural values and practices that some have described as a “culture of
poverty”, and an aversion to honoring the human rights of women from the top down to
the bottom (Ahmady 2016). What these analyses have shown is that the bleak picture
reported in the media and in scattered research articles does not exaggerate the reality for
girls in Iran, but only further demonstrates the need for action and more information.
In these samples thousands of child brides were revealed in census numbers.
These girls were overwhelmingly married to adult men, and so many of these marriages
were to those that were so significantly older that little doubt exists about the
circumstances of these marriages. This alarming trend is made even more fraught by what
the absence of data implies. To have such high percentages of husbands ages missing is
indicative of deliberate obfuscation. For the missing numbers to be concentrated at the
brides whose ages are below what is allowed by Sharia law and Iranian civil law suggests
that these age differences are even more shameful than what is reported. It implicitly
corroborates the fears of everyday Iranians, journalists, researchers, and advocates; the
reality is worse than what we know. What we know from this data is enough to apply
international pressure on Iran to join treaties, to enact and to enforce national laws, and to
record accurate data on births and marriages.
Recently Asghari argued that “the law cannot be the sole agent of change” and
that “introducing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ response is impossible and even futile” in
considering international desire for actions to reduce CEFM in Iran (2019). While it may
not be a magic wand, multiple studies have shown that strict laws on the minimum age-
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of-marriage have a significant impact on reducing adolescent fertility, which has been
documented as a significant risk to the health of girls and their children (Clark et al.
2006; Godha, Hotchkiss, and Gage 2013; Kim et al. 2013; Maswikwa et al. 2015; Placek
and Quinlan 2012). The evidence overwhelmingly supports the ability of laws to shape
behaviors, but it requires the support of legislation, enforcement, and infrastructure
(education and registration systems) (Adu Boahen and Yamauchi 2018; Girls Not Brides
2020b; Hanmer and Elefante 2016; Harbitz and Tamargo 2009; Kim et al. 2013;
Maswikwa et al. 2015; Melchiorre and Atkins 2011; United Nations Population Fund
2012). While some girls in Iran may want to get married early seeking a variety social
advantages that their society may confer to this status, it doesn’t reduce their agency to
deny them the choice to marry early, nor is setting a legal standard that reflects interest in
the health and well-being as paternalistic as forcing them to marry (Asghari 2019; United
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 2020; United Nations
Population Fund 2012). Human rights are universal by definition, if we are to bend them
to fit in different value-systems, then they are no longer effectively rights, but simply one
of many options governments may elect to choose.
Within a country that does not see CEFM as criminal, it persists unencumbered. It
expands beyond the limits of the loosely interpreted cultural norms and into new
generations. The harmful consequences for these girls will inevitably continue throughout
the lifecourse. In Iran, more effort is put into maintaining the practice than eliminating it.
As Shahrbanou Imami, member of Tehran’s City Council and former member of the
mullahs’ parliament, told the state-run ILNA news agency in 2018 “Today, our laws have
regressed” (Iran Human Rights Monitor 2018). The data demonstrate that without
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accountability, internationally, nationally, or locally, the norms around CEFM in Iran
continue to extend further and further. Improved data collection and further research is
desperately needed to further verify and better understand this important finding.
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Figure 4.1. Age Differences Between Spouses Among Child Brides in Iran, 2011
Caption: This figure illustrates how the age differences between spouses on the y-axis
diminish as the bride’s age increases on the x-axis. The red horizontal reference line
represents the average age difference in the analytic sample (husband is 8.68 years
older). For 33% of all child brides the age difference was above the average, but for 12
year old brides the percentage was substantially higher (81.25%). The white dot is a
marker for the median age difference, the boxes depict the interquartile range with
whiskers extending to the upper & lower adjacent, as in standard box plots. This is
overlaid with a blue shade that represents the density of the data. The number of child
brides at a given age is reported in parentheses.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
To achieve the goal of the United Nations, a focus on creating environments
where delayed marriage is more socially desirable than early marriage is necessary. Girls
must be able to attend school. This is less likely when they are faced with barriers that
result from ineffective governments such as lack of birth registration, high school costs,
overcrowding, poor facilities, poor teachers, limited transportation, and unsafe conditions
(Hanmer and Elefante 2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012). Socially, changing
attitudes about delaying marriage requires community dialogue through information and
education sessions, the involvement of men, and positive media messaging (United
Nations Population Fund 2012). The family and leaders of the community participate in
the decision making about whether, when and whom a girl will marry, therefore working
with parents and the community stakeholders is vital in changing the attitudes and social
norms that perpetuate harmful practices such as child marriage (United Nations
Population Fund 2012).
Delaying marriage and childbearing has multiple demographic benefits (United
Nations Population Fund 2012). These benefits extend across communities and
generations, so it is in everyone’s interests to provide social and economic alternatives to
early marriage and childbearing and support girls who are already married (United
Nations Population Fund 2012; Wodon et al. 2017). Challenging the harmful practice of
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early marriage requires strict national and sub-national laws prohibiting it, birth
and marriage registration systems that reach everyone, social programs educating girls
and informing communities, and systematic action on the national level to move towards
gender equality and fostering a culture that respects human rights (Hanmer and Elefante
2016; United Nations Population Fund 2012). Policy can work when countries live up to
commitments made through multiple international treaties, but national promises require
investments before becoming local realities.
Early marriage is associated with an increased risk for numerous undesirable
outcomes at the individual level in physical and mental health, education, employment,
and agency that continually and cumulatively reduces a woman’s life chances. This
negatively impacts the health and wellbeing of her children in similar ways that create an
intergenerational cycle of poor health and poverty. This has significant negative impacts
on the larger population, straining the resources of communities and creating complex
policy problems for countries.
The continuation of the practice reflects a high value placed on marriage and
family in society, but in light of the overwhelming empirical evidence demonstrating its’
deleterious effects, the costs being paid are too great. Girls can no longer be expected to
fulfill the adult roles of wife and mother in modern society. Delaying marriage until at
least age 18, developing girls into young women through education, and allowing women
to have agency, is valuing marriage and family in a way that pays intergenerational
dividends to society.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL, STUDY 1

Table A1. By Country Legal Age of Marriage with Development and Religious
Characteristics

Country

Legal
Age of
Marriag
e for
Girls

Legal
Exceptio
n

Minimu
m Age
with
Exceptio
n

HDI
Rank

Afghanistan

GDP per
capita

Total
Fertilit
y Rate

Adolescen
t Fertility
Rate

Religious
Majority
&
Percentag
e

171

$569.90

5.5

98

M 99%

Albania

16

no

16

85

$4,094.40

1.7

15

M 80%

Algeria

18

no

18

83

2.9

6

M 99%

Andorra

16

yes

14

34

$4,473.50
$39,639.4
0

Angola
Antigua
and
Barbuda

18

yes

15

149

$3,928.80

6.3

0

no

0

58

Argentina

16

yes

0

40

Armenia

17

17

85

Australia

18

no

16

2

Austria

18

yes

16

23

Azerbaijan

15

no

Bahamas

15

no

78
15

Bahrain

55
45

Bangladesh

18

yes

0

142

Barbados

18

no

16

57

Belarus

18

no

0

50

Belgium

18

no

0

21

97

$13,017.3
0
$11,198.6
0

C 90%
146

2.1

C 91%
C 93%

2.4

54

C 85%

$3,124.80
$51,845.7
0
$46,659.8
0

1.6

33

C 99%

1.9

12

C 67%

1.4

9

C 80%

$5,842.80
$21,920.5
0
$20,386.0
0

2

31

M 97%

1.9

28

C 96%

2.1

15

M 70%

$760.30
$15,901.4
0

2.3

67

M 90%

1.8

41

C 95%

$5,818.90
$44,282.5
0

1.5

20

C 71%

1.8

11

C 64%

Belize

18

no

18

101

$4,344.10

2.7

70

C 88%

Benin

15

no

15

166

$733.00

5

96

C 53%

$88,207.30

1.6

Bhutan

18

no

18

132

$2,201.30

2.2

44

B 75%

Bolivia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina

14

no

14

119

$1,981.20

3.1

74

C 94%

Bermuda

C 75%

18

no

16

85

$4,392.50

1.3

13

C 52%

Botswana

14

no

14

106

$6,244.00

2.9

43

C 72%

Brazil

18

no

18

75

$11,124.20

1.8

76

C 89%

Brunei

0

no

0

31

$31,453.20

1.9

23

M 75%

Bulgaria

18

yes

16

59

$6,752.60

1.5

36

C 82%

Burkina Faso

17

yes

15

183

$574.50

5.8

117

M 62%

0

184

$214.20

6.2

21

C 92%

Burundi
Cambodia

18

no

18

143

$782.70

2.8

32

B 97%

Cameroon

15

yes

0

153

$1,147.20

4.9

114

C 70%

9

$47,463.60

1.6

11

C 69%

187

$446.80

4.5

98

C 90%

185

$895.90

6.5

136

M 55%

42

$12,785.10

1.8

56

C 89%

90

$4,514.90

1.7

9

U 52%

68

C 93%

Canada
Central
African
Republic

18

no

18

Chile

16

no

16

China

20

no

Colombia

18

yes

12

97

$6,250.70

2

69

$7,986.00

1.9

62

C 91%

Cote d'Ivoire

21

yes

0

172

$1,236.10

5.2

103

C 44%

Croatia

18

yes

16

47

$13,509.20

1.5

13

C 94%

67

$5,688.70

1.6

44

C 59%

Chad

Costa Rica

Cuba
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo

16

yes

0

32

$30,438.90

1.5

5

C 73%

18

yes

16

28

$19,764.00

1.4

9

U 76%

15

no

15

176

$311.20

6.3

168

C 96%

Denmark

18

yes

15

4

$57,647.70

1.8

5

C 84%

Djibouti

18

yes

0

168

$1,358.50

3.4

19

M 97%

Dominica
Dominican
Republic

18

yes

16

94

$6,937.30

yes

0

101

$5,442.00

2.6

103

Ecuador

18

yes

12

Egypt

16

no

El Salvador
Equatorial
Guinea

18

yes

Eritrea

0

no

Estonia

18

yes

Ethiopia

0

no

0

15

C 95%
C 88%

88

$4,657.30

2.6

80

C 94%

108

$2,668.00

3.3

40

M 95%

116

$3,547.10

2

76

C 88%

138

$17,441.10

5.1

114

C 88%

186

$451.40

4.5

52

C 63%

30

$14,641.40

1.6

17

U 60%

174

$341.90

4.8

46

C 63%

98

Fiji

21

yes

16

90

$3,652.00

2.6

43

C 64%

Finland

18

yes

0

24

$46,205.20

1.8

9

C 82%

France

18

yes

0

22

$40,705.80

2

6

C 63%

yes

0

110

$9,312.00

4.1

80

C 77%

175

$562.60

5.8

66

M 95%

76

$2,613.80

1.8

39

C 89%

Gabon
Gambia
Georgia

18

yes

16

Germany

16

no

16

6

$41,788.00

1.4

7

C 69%

Ghana

18

no

18

140

$1,323.10

4.3

62

C 75%

Greece

18

yes

0

29

$26,841.90

1.4

9

C 88%

$40,447.30

2.1

Greenland

C 96%

Grenada

21

yes

0

79

$7,365.70

2.2

35

C 97%

Guatemala

14

no

14

128

$2,806.00

3.4

102

C 95%

Guinea
Guinea
Bissau

17

17

182

$430.10

5.3

131

M 84%

0

no

0

178

$518.60

5

95

M 45%

Guyana

16

yes

0

124

$2,998.90

2.6

52

C 66%

Haiti

18

yes

0

163

$662.30

3.2

41

C 87%

Honduras

18

yes

16

131

$2,110.80

2.6

85

C 88%

Hungary

18

yes

16

44

$13,009.30

1.3

13

C 81%

Iceland

18

yes

0

16

$41,620.10

2

11

C 95%

India

18

no

18

130

$1,387.90

2.6

73

H 80%

Indonesia

21

yes

16

110

$3,125.20

2.5

42

M 87%

Iran

13

no

13

69

$6,299.90

1.8

25

M 99%

121

$4,487.40

4.1

85

M 99%

0

6

$48,260.70

2

8

C 92%

Iraq
Ireland

18

yes

Israel

0

no

0

18

$30,736.40

3

14

J 76%

Italy

18

yes

16

27

$35,877.90

1.4

4

C 83%

Jamaica

18

yes

16

99

$4,902.00

2.3

69

C 77%

Japan

16

no

16

20

$42,909.20

1.4

6

U 57%

Jordan

18

no

18

80

$4,370.70

3.4

23

M 97%

Kazakhstan

18

yes

16

56

$9,070.60

2.6

25

M 70%

Kenya

0

no

0

145

$991.90

4.6

98

C 85%

Kiribati

16

no

16

137

$1,465.50

3.8

Kuwait

15

no

15

48

$37,725.10

2.7

14

M 74%

Kyrgyzstan

18

yes

17

120

$880.00

3.2

33

M 88%

Laos

18

no

18

141

$1,147.10

3.2

29

B 66%

Latvia

18

no

18

46

$11,319.50

1.3

12

C 56%

no

0

67

$8,763.80

1.5

15

M 61 %

yes

0

161

$1,088.00

3.3

60

C 97%

177

$326.60

4.9

121

C 86%

2

M 97%

Lebanon

0

Lesotho
Liberia
Libya

20

no

20

94

$11,933.80

2.6

Liechtenstein

18

yes

0

13

$140,102.00

1.7

99

C 97%

C 92%

Lithuania

18

yes

0

37

$11,988.80

1.6

16

C 90%

Luxembourg

16

no

16

19

$103,267.30

1.5

8

C 70%

Macedonia

18

yes

16

81

$4,561.20

1.5

17

C 59%

Madagascar

18

yes

0

154

$414.10

4.6

122

C 85%

0

no

0

173

$365.50

5.4

104

C 83%

Malaysia

18

yes

0

62

$9,069.00

2

9

M 64%

Maldives

18

yes

0

104

$6,330.80

2.2

10

M 98%

Mali

15

yes

0

179

$610.80

6.5

167

M 92%

Malta
Marshall
Islands

16

no

16

37

$19,694.10

1.5

11

C 97%

18

no

18

$3,124.30

4.1

Mauritania

18

yes

0

156

$1,207.80

4.8

71

M 99%

Mauritius

18

yes

16

63

$7,772.10

1.6

31

H 56%

Mexico

14

yes

0

0

no

Moldova

16

yes

14

Monaco

15

yes

0

Mongolia

18

no

18

90

$2,650.30

2.6

19

B 55%

Montenegro

18

yes

16

49

$6,682.30

1.7

14

C 78%

Morocco

15

no

15

126

$2,857.70

2.5

10

M 99%

Mozambique
Myanmar
(Burma)

18

yes

16

180

$417.50

5.5

122

C 57%

14

yes

0

148

$1,421.50

2.3

12

B 81%

Namibia

21

yes

0

126

$5,143.10

3.6

52

C 98%

Nepal

21

yes

16

145

$595.40

2.5

84

H 81%

Netherlands

18

yes

0

5

$50,341.30

1.8

4

C 51%

New Zealand

20

yes

16

9

$33,394.10

2.1

17

C 57%

Nicaragua

18

yes

14

125

$1,523.50

2.4

104

C 86%

yes

0

188

$351.00

7.7

192

M 98%

152

$2,315.00

5.8

111

C 49%

$569.80

2

1

U 71%

Malawi

Micronesia

Niger

C 98%

74

$8,851.40

2.3

65

C 95%

123

$2,838.40

3.4

18

C 95%

107

$1,631.50

1.5

29

C 97%

$145,221.20

C 86%

Nigeria

18

yes

0

North Korea

17

no

17

Norway

18

yes

16

1

$87,646.30

1.9

7

C 85%

Oman

18

yes

0

52

$19,920.60

2.9

9

M 86%

Pakistan

18

yes

0

147

$1,043.30

3.8

28

M 96%

Palau
Palestinian
territories

0

no

0

60

$9,004.60

113

$2,338.70

4.1

48

M 98%

Panama
Papua New
Guinea

14

no

14

60

$7,958.60

2.5

75

C 93%

0

no

0

158

$1,418.90

3.9

61

C 99%

Paraguay

16

yes

14

112

$3,225.60

2.7

66

C 97%

Peru

18

yes

14

84

$5,056.30

2.5

48

C 96%

0

no

0

115

$2,145.20

3.1

46

C 93%

18

yes

16

36

$12,597.50

1.3

12

C 94%

Philippines
Poland

100

C 87%

Portugal

18

yes

16

43

$22,540.00

1.4

12

C 94%

$26,435.70

1.7

50

C 97%

32

$70,870.20

2.1

15

M 68%

136

$2,953.20

5

112

C 86%

Puerto Rico
Qatar
Republic of
the Congo

16

Romania

16

yes

15

52

$8,297.50

1.5

28

C 99%

Russia

18

yes

0

50

$10,675.00

1.6

23

C 73%

Rwanda

21

yes

0

163

$553.60

4.3

35

C 93%

Samoa

19

yes

0

105

$3,530.60

4.3

25

C 97%

San Marino
Sao Tome
and Principe

18

yes

16

18

yes

14

143

$1,142.20

4.7

54

C 82%

Saudi Arabia

0

no

0

39

$18,754.00

2.9

23

M 93%

Senegal

16

yes

16

170

$998.10

5.2

88

M 96%

Serbia

16

no

16

66

$5,411.90

1.4

19

C 93%

Seychelles

18

yes

0

64

$10,805.10

2.4

0

no

0

181

$446.30

5

100

M 78%

Singapore

18

yes

0

11

$46,570.00

1.2

7

B 34%

Slovakia

18

yes

16

35

$16,554.90

16

C 85%

Slovenia
Solomon
Islands

18

yes

0

25

$23,438.90

1.6

4

C 78%

0

no

0

156

$1,276.30

4.2

64

C 97%

$111.20

6.8

68

M 99%

South Africa

21

yes

12

116

$7,390.00

2.4

50

C 81%

South Korea

16

no

16

17

$22,151.20

1.2

6

U 46%

169

$1,563.90

5.3

Sierra Leone

yes

0

$62,993.40

Somalia

South Sudan

C 92%

C 94%

C 61%

Spain

14

no

14

26

$30,737.80

1.3

10

C 79%

Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and
Nevis

18

yes

0

73

$2,746.60

2.3

22

B 69%

16

no

16

77

$13,227.00

St. Lucia
St. Vincent
and the
Grenadines

18

yes

0

89

$7,043.50

2

55

C 91%

15

no

15

97

$6,231.70

2

54

C 89%

Sudan

21

yes

10

167

$1,421.50

4.6

52

M 91%

Suriname

13

no

13

103

$8,430.90

2.4

34

C 52%

Swaziland

21

yes

0

150

$2,956.70

3.5

66

C 88%

yes

0

14

$52,076.40

1.9

7

C 67%

18

3

$74,277.10

1.5

4

C 81%

Sweden

C 95%

Switzerland

18

no

Syria

17

yes

0

134

$2,080.00

3

36

M 93%

Tajikistan

17

yes

16

129

$744.20

3.5

25

M 97%

Tanzania

15

yes

0

151

$708.50

5.4

128

C 61%

Thailand

17

yes

0

93

$5,111.90

1.5

36

B 93%

Timor-Leste

15

no

15

133

$875.80

5.5

51

C 99%

0

no

0

162

$496.50

4.8

53

C 43%

Togo

101

Trinidad and
Tobago

12

no

12

64

$15,840.40

1.8

31

C 66%

Tunisia

18

no

18

96

$4,176.60

2.2

4

M 99%

Turkey

18

yes

14

72

$10,111.50

2.1

30

M 98%

Turkmenistan

18

yes

16

109

$4,392.70

2.4

17

M 93%

Uganda

0

no

0

163

$608.80

6.1

124

C 87%

Ukraine
United Arab
Emirates
United
Kingdom

17

yes

0

81

$2,974.00

1.5

26

C 84%

41

$34,341.90

1.8

23

M 77%

16

no

16

14

$38,292.90

1.9

30

C 71%

United States

0

yes

0

8

$48,374.10

1.9

26

C 78%

Uruguay

12

no

12

52

$11,938.30

2.1

59

C 58%

Uzbekistan

17

yes

16

114

$1,377.10

2.3

13

M 97%

Vanuatu

21

yes

16

134

$2,965.80

3.5

50

C 93%

Venezuela

18

yes

0

71

$13,581.40

2.4

87

C 89%

Vietnam

18

no

18

116

$1,333.60

1.8

22

F 45%

Yemen

15

yes

0

160

$1,310.10

4.6

65

M 99%

Zambia

0

no

0

139

$1,456.10

5.6

138

C 98%

16

yes

0

155

$674.30

4

52

C 87%

Zimbabwe

Notes: Religion Key B= Buddhist, C=Christian, F=Folk, H=Hindu, J=Jewish, M=Muslim, U=Unaffiliated
Minimum Age "0"= No Minimum Specified

The 26 countries where the percentage of girls married before 18 exceeded the percentage of girls
enrolled in secondary school in 2010 are highlighted
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Table A2. Test of Moderation by Religion Type
Independent Variable Legal Exception¹

b

Religiously Homogenous

0.73

(0.48)

Muslim Majority
Other Majority

0.73
0.46

(0.89)
(0.68)

Religiously Homogenous*Muslim Majority
Religiously Homogenous*Other Majority

1.29
-0.44

(1.12)
(1.58)

Notes: Model controls for GDPpc, HDI, TFR,
and region. ¹indicates Christian as the referent
group.() Standard Error
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL, STUDY 3

Figure B.1. Age Differences Between Spouses Among Child Brides in Iran, 2006
Caption: This figure illustrates how the age differences between spouses on the y-axis
diminish as the bride’s age increases on the x-axis. The red horizontal reference line
represents the average age difference in this analytic sample (husband is 8.17 years
older). For 40% of all child brides the age difference was above the average, but for 12
year old brides the percentage was substantially higher (66.67%).The white dot is a
marker for the median age difference, the boxes depict the interquartile range with
whiskers extending to the upper & lower adjacent, as in standard box plots. This is
overlaid with a blue shade that represents the density of the data. The number of child
brides at a given age is reported in parentheses.
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Figure B.2. Actual Ages of Husbands of Child Brides in Iran, 2011
Caption: The horizontal reference line represents the age of 18 for the
husband. Any cases at or above this line represent the child bride was
currently married to an adult. The white dot is a marker for the median
age of the husbands, the thick line shows the interquartile range with
whiskers extending to the upper & lower adjacent, as in standard box
plots. This is overlaid with a grey shade that represents the density of
the data. The number of child brides at a given age is reported in
parentheses.
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